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PASSING ON THE MONOPOLY OVERCHARGE:
A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY ANALYSIS
ROBERT G. HARRis t AND LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN f
Technological development and increasing specialization in the
American economy have fostered structural complexity. Conse-
quently (and despite considerable vertical integration), most trans-
formations from basic inputs to finished products involve a series of
transactions in a lengthy production-distribution chain. Monopoly
power can be exercised at or near the top of the chain as well as
farther down; indeed, it often is. Because retail, service, and whole-
sale markets are generally competitive except when market power
is created by restrictive distribution policies of firms higher on the
chain, variations from the competitive ideal are more frequently
encountered at the manufacturing, mining, and processing levels.1
When monopolization or cartelization takes place, participating
firms gain market power 2 and can price their products in excess of
competitive levels.8 The difference between such an enhanced price
and a competitive price is called a "monopoly overcharge," or
simply the "overcharge." 4 An overcharge exacted high on the dis-
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1 See generally the brief studies of thirteen industries in W. AnDms, THE
STnucTuRE OF AamxcAN INDus'my (4th ed. 1971). See also F. Scroumm, Lus-
ThRAL MABEET STucTmRE AND EcoNOMIc PmwoBMANCE (1970) (see especially
chapters 3, 4, & 9).
2 Market power can be defined as "the power of a firm to affect the price which
will prevail on the market in which the firm trades." L. SuLrIvAN, HANmBOOK OF
T-E LAw OF ANrrusT § 8 (1977).
3 A simple, theoretical description of the differences between competitive and
monopoly pricing is found in Gelihorn, An Introduction to Antitrust Economics,
1975 Dnr LJ. 1, 33-35.
4 This terminology has become customary. See, e.g., HOUSE Commf. ON Tm
JuDicCR Y, REPORT To AccoMPANr H.R. 11942, H.R. REP. No. 95-1397, pt. 1, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 HousE REPORT].
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tribution chain need not remain there. Firms which buy from a
monopolist or cartel member may simply mark up the price 6f
products they sell by all or part of (or even more than) the over-
charge, thus passing it on to buyers farther down the chain. The
complexity of the production-distribution chain and the fact that a
monopoly overcharge exacted at one level may be transmitted to
another give rise to the "passing on" problem which has been vex-
ing antitrust litigation for over a decade.5
Two Supreme Court decisions, Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp." and Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,7 are of
dominating significance. Hanover Shoe, decided in 1968, was a suit
against a monopolist by one of its customers seeking to recover three
times the amount of an alleged overcharge. The Court held that an
antitrust violator may not, as a rule, defend such a suit by proving
that the customer passed on all or part of the illegal overcharge to
its own customer.8 The Court reasoned that to allow the defense
would unduly complicate overcharge litigation and might result in
a violator retaining the fruits of its illegal conduct.9 Illinois Brick,
decided in 1977, involved down-chain plaintiffs suing members of a
cartel. The Court held that an antitrust plaintiff may not recover
5 Passing on is the subject of considerable case law. E.g., Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
392 U.S. 481 (1968); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); West Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440
F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). There is also extensive
legal literature. E.g., Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust
Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977); McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the
Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33
U. Prrr. L. REv. 177 (1971); Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages and the Passing-
On Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANrTRusT Bu.. 1183 (1968). There
is also some economic commentary. E.g., Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust
Treble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 Wm. & MAnY L. REv.
883 (1975).
6 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
7431 U.S. 720 (1977).
8 392 U.S. at 494. Dicta in the opinion carve out a limited exception under
which the passing-on defense would be available when passing on takes place
pursuant to a pre-existing cost-plus contract. Id.
In In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1163-67 (5th Cir. 1979),
the court interpreted this exception to be wider than we have supposed, thus indi-
cating that both policy analysis and institutionally based economic analysis may
appropriately be brought to bear by courts in applying the exception. In an opinion
by Judge Wisdom, the court said that the "cost-plus" exception may apply to any
transaction constituting the "functional equivalent of the cost-plus contract case."
Id. 1163. The court also said that functional equivalence was established whenever
the impact of a price change at one level upon the pricing decisions of firms at the
next level could be determined in advance, without regard to the interactions of
supply and demand, and it intimated that proof of the existence of a well-established
and consistently applied markup pricing system might meet this standard.
9 392 U.S. at 494.
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an illegal overcharge passed on to the plaintiff by an intermediate
firm which had in turn purchased from a cartel member.10 The
Court noted that Hanover Shoe precluded the defensive use of pass-
ing on, and that a symmetrical rule precluding its offensive use was
needed to protect defendants from the risk of duplicative treble-
damage liability.1 It also reiterated the Hanover Shoe concern
about complexity and stressed the limited capacity of courts to deal
with passing-on issues.'2 Indeed, Hanover Shoe was expressive of
an asserted tradition under which courts award damages only to the
party immediately injured, thus terminating analysis at the "first
step." Is Finally, the Court in Illinois Brick took the view that the
deterrent effect of the antitrust laws would be maximized by assign-
ing the cause of action for an overcharge to the direct purchaser
only, whether or not that purchaser was in fact injured.
4
These decisions, far from settling the passing-on question, have
triggered intensive congressional involvement. Legislation to over-
rule Illinois Brick, supported by state officials 15 and federal anti-
trust-enforcement officials, 16 but opposed by business groups,17 has
been introduced in two successive sessions of Congress.18 In the
first session of the ninety-sixth Congress, such legislation, sponsored
by Senator Kennedy and Congressman Rodino, headed the antitrust
10 Like Hanover shoe, the opinion suggests the possibility of limited exceptions.
See 431 U.S. at 736 n.16, 745-46.
'lId. 730-31.
12 Id. 731-33.
13 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533
(1918), in which Justice Holmes asserted that the "general tendency of the law,
in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step."
14431 U.S. at 745-47.
15 State officials took leading roles in the efforts to override Illinois Brick in
both the 95th and 96th Congresses. See Restoring Effective Enforcement of the
Antitrust Laws: Hearings on H.R. 2060 and H.R. 2204 and Other Proposals Before
the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the-
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-79 (1979) (support of Nat'l Governors Ass'n)'
[hereinafter cited as 1979 House Hearings]; Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust
Laws: Hearings on H.R. 8359B Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commer-
cial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-71 (1978)
(support of Nat'l Ass'n of Attorney Generals) [hereinafter cited as 1978 House-
Hearings]; Fair and Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings on
S. 1874 Before the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 92-96,
101-28 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Senate Hearings].
16 See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 14-40; 1978 House Hearings,
supra note 15, at 6-23; 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, pt. 1, at 17-29.
'7 See, e.g., 1979 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 149-94; 1978 Senate
Hearings, supra note 15, pt. 1, at 141-49, 161-69; 1978 House Hearings, supra note
15, at 489-500.
18 See SENATE COMm. ON THE JUDICiARY, REPORT TO Acco~NTANY S. 300, S.
REP. No. 96-239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 SENATE
REPORT].
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agenda in both houses.19 There seems to be little doubt that if it
fails to pass now, it will be introduced again next session2
This pending legislation addresses the controversial issues
raised in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. One concern is
duplicative liability, or, more broadly conceived, compensatory
justice. If a monopolist or cartelist is not protected against the
possibility of successful overcharge suits by successive purchasers at
different levels of distribution, it would be liable more than once
for three times the amount of the overcharge, a potential liability
exceeding the damages Congress has mandated21 and which imagi-
nation easily stretches to ruinous amounts. 2 To assign the cause of
action to the direct purchaser only, however, as the Court did in
Illinois Brick, strains against another compensatory concern: to the
extent that the direct purchaser passes the overcharge on, a damage
award to it is a windfall, and some purchaser farther down the chain
is left with an uncompensated loss.23
Factual complexity and judicial capacity are also difficult issues.
If one supposes, as the Court perhaps has done, that each decision
about passing on by each sequential price-setter is sui generis, the
prospect of using adjudication to trace a particular overcharge down
its particular chain is a daunting one.2 4 Further, despite what
others have argued, a general theoretical analysis alone does not
necessarily simplify the problem.2 Nonetheless, there are realms of
inquiry that stand between open-ended, unguided exploration of
each specific situation and application of unbounded, universal
theoretical principles. It may be possible to narrow the theoretical
universe in ways that suggest useful presumptions. 26 Moreover, it
19 See, e.g., Senate Committee Approves Bill to Overrule Illinois Brick Rule,
11979] 913 ANTITRUST & TRADE BEG. RaE. (BNA) A-7 to -9.
20 We draw this inference on the basis of the support for the legislation from
state officials, antitrust enforcement officials, and the leadership of the relevant
congressional committees. See notes 16-18 supra.
2 1 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person injured in his business
or property by a violation of the antitrust laws may recover three times the damage
sustained. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
22 1979 SENATE RPEoRT, supra note 18, at 149-52 (minority and additional
views).
23 The potential, uncompensated losses, though difficult to quantify, are cer-
tainly exceedingly large. See 1979 SmATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 16-17.
24 Such complexity is envisaged by those opposed to legislation to overrule
Illinois Brick. See 1979 SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 157-59 (minority and
additional views).
25 See, e.g., 1978 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 192-95 (statement of
Richard A. Posner).
26 Presumptive rules and guidelines in antitrust are based upon such a process
of deriving practice from theory. See, e.g., Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines,
[19681 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510.
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may also be possible to make institutionally based, middle-level
generalizations which will make inquiry into particular situations
more manageable.
2 7
Deterrence is also a troublesome question. First, there is little
theoretical or empirical information to help one decide whether
direct or more remote purchasers are more likely to challenge over-
charges. Second, matters of complexity and judicial capacity ob-
viously also bear on the matter, though not in any direct way.28
Finally, it may ultimately be necessary to make some trade-off be-
tween maximizing compensatory justice and maximizing deterrence.
Yet, policy judgments about deterrence should be informed by
empirical and institutional factors.
This Article attempts a comprehensive analysis of these issues-
more comprehensive in several respects than anything now in the
literature. In part I we draw on microeconomics to do a theoretical
analysis of passing on. We show that the extent of passing on in a
particular market depends mainly upon the elasticities of demand
and supply.29 While this general approach informs some of the
legislative testimony 30 and scholarly commentary 31 already avail-
able, our analysis contains three new contributions, each of signifi-
cance in policy formulation. First, on the basis of both analytical
and empirical factors, we identify from the range of possible analyti-
cal models the particular variants most likely to be encountered in
markets in which antitrust overcharges are likely to occur. Abstract
models, if carefully selected, can offer insights which may transcend,
and thereby aid in the understanding of, specific cases. Such models,
however, if not chosen with skill and judgment, can obscure or mis-
lead. Those who have used this kind of approach in the past have
stressed the wide range of possible results and have implied that
judgments about the extent of passing on are difficult.32  By narrow-
27 By "institutionally based" generalizations, we mean those that rely not solely
upon theory but also upon relevant industrial custom, practice, and procedures.
28 In general, the more confident one was that courts could easily and accurately
decide passing-on issues, the less convincing one would find the contention that
deterrence would be enhanced by excluding passing-on evidence.
29The elasticity concept (in relation to demand) is explained in Gellhorn,
supra note 3, at 19-22. See also note 44 infra & accompanying text.
30 See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, pt. 2, at 89-101 (statement of
Betty Bock). Compare id., pt. 2, at 311-19 (statement of Dorsey D. Ellis) with
id., pt. 2, at 51-54 (statement of Richard A. Posner). A less thorough, preliminary
version of the analysis completed in this Article was presented in Congress by one
of the authors at 1979 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 119-30.
31 For an excellent pre-Illinois Brick review of the economics of passing on,
see Schaefer, supra note 5.
32 See, e.g., 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 15 (statement of Betty Bock),
especially pt. 2, at 91.
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ing the theoretical range, we provide a basis for more confident
prediction about what is likely to occur in markets in which passing
on is likely. Second, we focus sharply on the dimension of time.
We show that the extent of passing on is likely to be high in the
long run even when it is low in the short run. Third, we emphasize
the greater significance of supply factors over demand factors in
passing-on analysis and, in so doing, sharpen the policy perspective.
In its entirety, our analysis suggests that in markets in which
monopoly overcharges are likely to be found, a high degree of pass-
ing on almost always occurs eventually and is likely to occur quite
rapidly.
Without the enrichment of an empirical analysis, even a sen-
sitive theoretical analysis may provide a weak basis for inferences
about real-world situations. Having concluded that, in theory,
passing on is likely in monopolized or cartelized markets, we turn,
in part II, to institutional material. From the extensive marketing
literature about actual commercial pricing practices, we identify
two widely utilized pricing methods. We show both how these
affect the likelihood of passing on and how they provide a man-
ageable way to determine whether and to what extent passing on
has occurred in particular cases. This study confirms that a high
degree of passing on (sometimes exceeding 100%) is frequent. More
important, it serves to demystify questions about how passing on
can be traced.
In part III we focus on the limited differences between the
theoretical and institutional analyses and seek to reconcile them.
Specifically, we identify the mechanisms through wkich prices set
by methods not deliberately attuned to marginal costs may never-
theless be brought into congruence with marginal costs. We also
note the limits of these mechanisms.
We draw in part IV upon these theoretical and institutional
analyses and their reconciliation to identify two separate, yet har-
monious, methodologies that could be used to determine the extent
of passing on in particular cases. The first draws upon the the-
oretical analysis and the reconciliation to identify several simplified
structural factors-all readily identifiable in markets in which they
occur-that will be useful in making estimates about the extent of
passing on in particular cases. This methodology requires only a
modest amount of empirical information and thus could save time
and expense. The estimates ought to be highly accurate in most
cases-certainly accurate enough to serve as presumptions subject
to rebuttal by detailed evidence of the pricing methods used and
[Vol. 12.8:2.69
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their passing on consequences. The second method is a direct and
precise (and carefully structured) empirical inquiry into what is
actually occurring in the particular market. This method, informed
primarily by the institutional analysis, requires more data and is
even more accurate.
Part V constitutes a demonstration section, a workshop. We
evaluate the sixty-five price-fixing cases brought and won by the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division between 1963 and 1972.
Then, drawing upon the prior analysis and, in particular, upon
the structural factors discussed in part IV(A), we illustrate how
judgments about passing on can be made from available data. We
specify the recurrent situations in which the first purchaser will
absorb the overcharge and we show that these can readily be identi-
fied. In all other situations, some passing on has occurred. In
some of these, it may not be possible to determine either the class
or the individual purchasers to whom the overcharge has been
passed on; in others, it will be possible to determine the class but
not the individual firms; in still others, both the class and the in-
dividual victims will be readily determinable. In each of the
last two categories, it will in most cases be easy to determine whether
or not there is a great probability that a high percentage of the
overcharge has been passed on. In sum, we use this part to
illustrate specific, manageable inquiries through which a court
can investigate and resolve passing-on questions with reasonable
confidence and dispatch.
In part VI we return to the policy issues raised by Hanover
Shoe and Illinois Brick, which have been debated extensively in
Congress. We seek to show that where it is possible to trace pass-
ing on, the best balance between concerns about compensatory
justice and about deterrence is achieved by allowing both the of-
fensive use of passing-on evidence and also its defensive use when
reasonably necessary to avoid the risk of duplicative recovery. By
contrast, the case for rejecting proof of passing on is strong when
its extent is highly speculative and when the defendant, as a prac-
tical matter, faces no significant risk of duplicative recovery.
I. THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PASSING ON
Economic theory relating to passing on, formally known as
"incidence theory," 3 draws upon the standard tools and utilizes
3 3 For an excellent treatment of tax-incidence theory, see B. MusGRAVE &
P. MUscREVE, PuBLic FiNANCE w TnHoEY AND PRACTICE (1973) (see especially
chapter 19). The cause of the price increase makes no difference to the analysis;
1979]
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the conventional assumptions of neoclassical microeconomics.
Other studies using this approach have focused on short-run analysis,
emphasized the wide range of possibilities suggested by the models
(from no passing on to total passing on), and stressed that the extent
of a pass on is a function of elasticity relationships which are hard
to measure in actual markets. 34 Thus, such studies have often con-
cluded that the existence and extent of passing on are indetermi-
nable.35 The utility of a general, theoretical analysis, however,
is seldom that it directly shows what is happening in particular
cases; 36 rather, its value is that it can identify central tendencies.
In what follows, we utilize long- as well as short-run analysis and
stress supply factors which are customarily of greater relevance to
passing on than are demand factors. In addition, we first utilize
and then vary the usual assumption that markets downstream from
the cartelized or monopolized one are all perfectly competitive. In
sum, we provide a fuller theoretical analysis than is typical.
Moreover, we use this material to gauge the scope of the
passing-on problem. Through simple analytic models we show that
in a multiple-level chain of distribution, passing on monopoly over-
charges is not the exception: it is the rule. This analysis then ad-
dresses one of the central policy issues regarding the standing of
indirect purchasers-compensatory justice. If in most situations
indirect purchasers ultimately bear the costs of monopoly over-
although we are assuming it is a monopoly overcharge, it could be a tax, price
fixing, or general inflation. This form of analysis was developed initially as "tax
incidence theory," which is concerned with who ultimately pays various forms of
taxes. Because a monopoly overcharge, resulting from noncompetitive structure or
collusive conduct, is theoretically analogous to an excise tax (that is, a sales tax on
a specific product), our analysis follows closely the incidence theory as applied to
excise taxes.
Not only is the theoretical literature on tax incidence well developed, but there
is also an extensive body of empirical studies of incidence by public-finance econ-
omists. E.g., Brownlee & Perry, The Effect of the 1965 Federal Excise Tax Reduc-
tion on Prices, 20 NAT'L TAx J. 235 (1967). In most cases the complexities of tax
incidence make empirical analysis exceedingly more difficult than it is likely to be
in most antitrust passing-on cases. For an extensive survey of tax incidence theory
and empirical studies, see Break, The Incidence and Economic Effects of Taxation,
in THE ECONOMICS OF Punrac FINANCE 119 (1974).
34 See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 742 (1977); 1978
Senate Hearings, supra note 15, pt. 2, at 90-94 (statement of Betty Bock). But
see Schaefer, supra note 5, at 915 (such measurements "do not present insurmount-
able obstacles").
35 See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, pt. 2, at 90-94 (statement of Betty
Bock).
36 One of the potential misuses of a theoretical analysis is to move from the
blackboard to the marketplace without any basis for supposing that the theoretical
presuppositions are found in the marketplace. Another is to suppose that theoretical
referents such as "marginal cost" can be used as the building blocks for an operative
legal rule, even though the theoretical referent has no marketplace analogue.
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charges, then denying them redress and granting it to others not in
fact injured is inequitable. We also use the theoretical inquiry as
a source of concepts which, along with others drawn from institu-
tional sources, can be used as the basis for useful presumptions about
passing on. Thus, these models bear upon whether proof of pass-
ing on is too difficult for courts. This theoretical analysis also per-
.tains to the policy of deterrence. Supporters of Illinois Brick have
argued that disallowing both the offensive and defensive use of
passing on would increase the deterrent effect of private actions by
providing a strong incentive to direct purchasers to sue. The eco-
nomic model shows, however, that, because direct purchasers often
suffer little economic loss, their incentive to seek out and sue anti-
trust violators may be relatively weak.
In the sections which follow, we consider the extent of passing
on in the short run in situations in which downstream markets are
competitive, deal with long-run adjustments in such markets, and
finally, examine structures in which market power is exercised
downstream as well as at the level at which the overcharge is in-
itially imposed.
A. Short-Run Analysis When All Downstream
Markets are Competitive
To begin, let us introduce some terminology. Assume a three-
step production-distribution chain: a manufacturing level, a resell-
ing level, and a consumer level.37 We refer to the manufacturers as
M, resellers as R, and consumers as C. Because the M firms sell
their output to firms at level R, who in turn sell to final users-
firms or households at C-we classify R as direct purchasers and C
as indirect purchasers. We refer to any given output of M as Q.
and the price for this output as P.; for the reseller, output is speci-
fied as Qr, price as P,. Throughout part I, we make the standard
neoclassical assumption that all firms are profit-maximizing, which
means they set the price so that marginal cost is equal to marginal
revenue.3
8
3 7 We employ a three-level chain of production and distribution for the pur-
poses of graphical and expositional simplicity. The analytical models are general,
applying as well to any n-level chain of production. Perhaps the most important
source of simplification in our model is the assumption that the direct purchaser
only resells the manufacturers' product to consumers without transforming the
product physically. Again, the model is general and is applicable to cases in which
an intermediary is a manufacturer who uses the product of M as an input into its
production process.
3 8 See Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 22-35.
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The existence of a monopoly overcharge at the manufacturing
level implies that the M level is noncompetitive. We will assume
an effective cartel operating at that level, though the results would
be essentially the same if M were occupied by one firm, a monopo-
list.39 R?, the resale level, is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
This implies that each firm at R faces a perfectly elastic demand
curve, which means that it can sell at one and only one price-the
competitive price. (For the R level as a whole, the supply curve is
equivalent to the short-run marginal-cost curve.) Elasticity is a
measure of the responsiveness of demand (or supply) to changes in
price: given an increase in the price of a product, how much less
of the product will consumers be willing to purchase? If the
price of bread increases by 10% and consumers buy 5% fewer
loaves, the elasticity of demand is equal to -. 5. Elasticity, usually
symbolized by e, is defined as the percentage change in quantity
divided by the percentage change in price. Note that the higher
the elasticity of demand, the more responsive consumers are to
price changes. At the limits, perfectly elastic demand would
mean that any increase in price would cause consumers to buy none
of the product; by contrast, perfectly inelastic demand would mean
that consumers would buy the same amount even though the price
increased.
Our concern is with the effect upon Pr, the price charged by
firms at level R, when M imposes a monopoly overcharge which
causes P., the price charged by M, to increase. If Pm goes up by a
certain amount (to which we refer as APJ, what will happen to Pr,
the price paid for the product by the ultimate consumers?
We begin with a short-run analysis of the case in which R is a
perfectly competitive level.40 In this context, the short run means a
period of time shorter than that within which firms at level R could
adjust capacity through, for example, changes in plant or capital
equipment in order to respond to the increase imposed by M. In
the short run, then, firms must respond to a price increase without
3 9 An effective cartel, like a monopolist, would exercise power to raise price
above the competitive level although the cartelized price would still be lower than
a pure monopoly price. See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 158-82.
40 The "short run" in economic theory refers to a time period in which invest-
ment level (or, alternatively, production capacity) is fixed, so that producers must
meet any increase in demand by increasing the rate at which existing capacity is
used rather than by increasing capacity. In the "long run" all factors of production
are variable, which means that producers have sufficient time to plan, construct,
and begin operating additional facilities. The length of time to which the long run
refers depends upon the particular industry. In the steel industry, for example, it
might take five or ten years to build a new mill, whereas a retailer might expand
capacity in a matter of months.
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altering their levels of investment. How long the short run may be
will vary, of course, from industry to industry. Some capacity ad-
justments can be made very quickly; others may take months or
years. To make discussion more concrete, we suggest that one year
be viewed as a demarcation point. Based on institutional factors
such as those discussed in part II, it is our sense that in most in-
dustries long-run adjustments would have begun, and in some cases
been completed, within a year after a significant increase in a factor
cost was imposed. By contrast, short-run adjustments, which are
likely to be made by the next time that prices are changed, will
frequently be completed within weeks and seldom, if ever, take
longer than a year.
1. Monopoly Overcharge on a "Fixed Cost" Item
Figure 1 shows two contrasting equilibrium prices and out-
puts 41 in the market between R and C,42 before and after M im-
poses a monopoly overcharge which increases R's costs. The ques-
tion is how much of the overcharge will be passed on by the R firms
when they resell to the C firms or households. The answer depends
upon whether the cost to the R firms of the product purchased from
M is a variable or a fixed cost. In our model, firms at level R are
not final consumers. They use the products they buy from firms at
level M as inputs into their own production, distribution, or service
functions which are then sold to C. Thus, prices charged by M on
sales to R are one element of the overall cost incurred by R in pro-
ducing the item or service it sells to C. Economists subdivide these
input costs into two categories, fixed costs and variable costs.
Suppose, for example, that R firms are sporting goods stores
and that M firms produce and sell to R firms machines used to
string tennis and squash rackets. Then, for R, the cost of M's
product is a fixed cost in that it will not vary directly with the sales
of tennis rackets or racket-stringing services. Thus, the increase in
M's price that results from the monopoly overcharge has no effect
upon the supply curve of R: because R firms cannot reduce their
costs by supplying less at the current market price for their products
4 1 In dynamic economies, markets are constantly in motion, changing in re-
sponse to factors like shifting preferences, technology, entry and exit of firms, and
development of new products. The "equilibrium" is an abstraction used to portray
the results of market competition (in terms of price and output levels) if the market
were to come to rest. A simple physical analogue is the pendulum: its equilibrium
point is the bottom of the arc through which it swings, whether or not the pendulum
ever comes to rest there.
4 2 The model could be extended from a three-level chain to an n-level chain
without altering the analysis. See note 37 supra.
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Figure 1. PASSING-ON IN THE SHORT-RUN, COMPETITIVE CASE.*
A. Increase in R's Fixed Costs
SRA C"
SRAC"
B. Increase in R's Variable Costs
S" (---SRM C")
S, (--SRMC,)
z 
LRMC"LRA 
C'
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* In this and succeeding figures 2, 3, and 4, the supply and demand curves
represent those of the industry R as a whole; not of individual R firms.
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and services, they have no reason to supply either more or less than
they were supplying before the overcharge was imposed upon them.
This is shown graphically in Figure I(A), where the supply curve is
unchanged by the increase in Pm; that is, S' = S" (for a competitive
industry, the supply curve is equivalent to the short-run marginal-
cost curve, which we abbreviate SRMC).
There is, of course, an increase in the average costs of R firms,
who must pay more for the racket-stringing equipment. This is
shown in Figure I(A) as a shift in the short-run average-cost curve
(SRAC) from SRAC' to SRA C". In spite of this increase in average
costs, though, the equilibrium price is unchanged by M's price fix-
ing because R's supply curve remains the same-graphically, Pr' =
P/'. In the short run, the resellers, R, bear all of the monopoly
overcharge on such a fixed-cost item, passing on none of it. Because
average costs now exceed the price (P." < SRA C" at Qr"), R firms
will earn less profit than at the precartelization price.
Additional examples of fixed costs for which R would have to
bear the monopoly overcharge in the short run are easily imagined:
at the retail level, refrigeration equipment for a butcher or grocer;
in service businesses, tables and chairs bought by a restaurant; at the
wholesale level, warehouse shelving; in manufacturing, production
machinery such as stitching equipment bought by a shoemaker. In
each of these cases and all those like them, any monopoly overcharge
resulting in an increase in fixed costs will be borne-in the short run
-entirely by the direct purchasers.
2. Monopoly Overcharge on a "Variable Cost" Item
When a monopoly overcharge increases the price of a variable
factor, the results are quite different. Suppose again that R firms
are sporting goods stores but that the M firms make tennis rackets
and sell them to these retailers. When M increases Pm to monopoly
levels, this results in an increase in short-run marginal costs for firms
at R level. The cost of the tennis rackets that R buys from M varies
directly with R's own output-its retail sales of tennis rackets. Be-
cause the price charged by M has gone up, each additional unit of
production by R will now cost more than it did before, by an
amount equal to the monopoly overcharge. Because the short-run
marginal-cost curve defines the supply curve for firms selling in a
competitive market, the overcharge imposed by M results in an
upward shift of the supply curve for firms at R. To maximize their
profits (or minimize their losses), these firms will now supply less, at
any given resale price (dictated by the competitive market in which
1979]
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they sell), than they would have supplied before the overcharge by
M increased their costs. This is illustrated by a vertical shift of S'
to S" in Figure 1(B). Thus, the overcharge imposed by the cartel
at M causes a change in the equilibrium price and output in the
market between R and C, from Pr to P/" and Q/ to QJ'. As a con-
sequence of the increase, APm, consumers pay more to, and buy less
from, the resellers at level R. This is the so-called short-run equi-
librium result: an increase in the price of a variable factor of pro-
duction shifts the supply curve, inducing a new equilibrium. In
this situation R firms will in the short run pass on a substantial part
of the overcharge.
In Figure 1(B), note that the rate of passing on is determined
by the relative elasticities of the demand and supply curves. The
steeper the demand curve relative to the supply curve,43 the larger
the share of the manufacturer's price increase, APm, that will be
passed on to the indirect purchasers, C, in the form of a higher
price, P/'. As a rule, we define the passing-on rate as the change in
the reseller's price divided by the change in the manufacturer's
price. 4 Note also on the basis of Figure 1(B) that there are two
important effects of the anticompetitive practice of M in the market
between R and C.4  The allocative effect is the decrease in output
from Qr' to Q/': consumers are worse off because, at the higher
price, they buy less of the reseller's (and, in turn, the manu-
facturer's) product.46 The distributive, or equity, effect is that con-
sumers pay an artificially high price for what they buy, yielding
43 Strictly speaking, elasticity is not equivalent to the slope of a curve. As a
rule, though, the slope of a curve is indicative of elasticity: the steeper the curve,
the less elasticity it indicates, and the flatter the curve, the more elasticity it
indicates.
44 Algebraically, the passing-on rate is defined as AP'
45 There is a third effect of the overcharge closely connected to the reduction
in output (the allocative effect) which is distributive in nature. Because con-
sumers buy less of W's product at the monopoly-overcharge-induced higher price,
the R firms may suffer losses from the overcharge even if they pass on all of the
overcharge on the products they continue to sell. The economic loss to the R firms
would not amount to the total value of the lost sales revenues. The loss would be
only that share of those revenues that would have accrued as profit to R firms.
This reduction is likely to be significant only if R's investment is relatively immobile
(that is, cannot be used to sell other products to make up for the lost sales) and
the elasticity of demand is high (so that the reduction in sales is substantial). In
any event, our analysis is concerned only with the passing on of the monopoly
overcharge on sales that actually occur, not with any losses due to foregone sales.
46The allocative effect is measured by the "welfare triangle" shown as the,
area bounded by Pr' on the bottom, Qr" on the left, and the demand curve on
the right. The shift in supply induces a price increase and reduction in consump-
tion, causing a "deadweight" loss of economic welfare. The loss is deadweight
because it inures to no one.
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what amounts to a transfer of income from consumers to manu-
facturers.
47
3. The Significance of Elasticities
Because the percentage of the overcharge on a variable-cost item
that will be passed on in the short run depends upon the relation-
ship between supply and demand elasticities, it is useful to focus on
the possible range of this relationship. Figure 2 displays the four
extreme types of supply-demand relationships-the limit cases, as it
were. We have assumed in each that the price increase by M raises
variable costs-that is, it shifts the supply curve upward. We con-
tinue to assume that R is a competitive industry and that each
firm maximizes profit.
In Figure 2(A), the supply curve for industry R is perfectly
elastic throughout the relevant range,48 thus indicating that these
firms can expand output without any increase in the unit costs of
the items produced. While perfect elasticity of supply would never
prevail indefinitely, no matter how great the increase, this par-
ticular limit case is one which is often encountered in real markets
within the range of expansion or contraction that firms are likely to
consider seriously. For example, a retail trade (say, sporting goods)
might greatly expand or contract sales of a particular product (say,
tennis rackets) with no change in per-unit, variable costs.49 Manu-
facturers of tennis rackets stand ready to meet large or small orders
at list price. The same would be true, for example, of a grocery
store ordering canned goods.
In such situations, when perfect supply elasticity prevails over
the relevant range, all of any monopoly overcharge imposed by man-
ufacturers is passed on to consumers. Because the overcharge in-
creases the cost of a variable item, the supply curve (as established
above) will in the short run move up from S' to S" by an amount
equal to the overcharge. Because at both the old and the new
level R can supply any amount within the relevant range without
47 The redistribution from consumers to producers is measured, in Figure I(B),
as the rectangle bounded by Pr' on the bottom, Pr" on the top, the vertical axis
on the left, and Qr" on the right.
48 Perfect elasticity (or perfect inelasticity) need not apply to the entire length
of the supply or demand curves. All that is relevant for the present analysis is the
elasticity within the observed range of price and output (for example, the elasticity
between Pr' and Pe").
49 When the costs of a product are "invoice costs," as is often the case in
retailing, the firm can presumably buy all it wants at the same price (at least up
to some reasonable limit). In fact, retailers often obtain special discounts for
buying large quantities, in which case the supply curve of R would slope downward.
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Figure 2. COMPARISON OF SHORT-RUN, COMPETITIVE RESULTS FOR
EXTREME TYPES OF SUPPLY-DEMAND RELATIONSHIPS.
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affecting its unit cost (because both S' and S" are flat, given perfect
supply elasticity within the relevant range), the entire overcharge
imposed by M is reflected in the price charged by firms at R when
they sell to firms or households at C. The change in Pr is equal
to the change in the manufacturer's price, APm. The overcharge
is thus passed on in full.
It is important to notice that this result obtains regardless of
the shape (or elasticity) of the demand curve. When the supply
curve is flat, the elasticity of demand will affect the extent to which
sales are reduced as price goes up, but it will not affect the extent
to which an overcharge is passed on. In this limit case, or cases
approaching it, supply is the factor crucial to passing on. Demand
has no impact on the rate of passing on here and little impact in
cases approaching the limit.
In the second limit case, shown in Figure 2(B), demand, rather
than supply, is perfectly elastic within the relevant range; hence,
the demand curve is flat. If the industry increases its price at all, it
will lose all sales. Because the resellers, R, cannot raise their price
even though M's overcharge has increased P., none of M's price
increase will be passed on to C. Here, the slope of the supply curve
determines the reduction in output, from Qr' to Qr", but has no
impact on the rate of passing on.
This limit case, unlike the last one, is not likely to be en-
countered in any real market. Individual firms may face a perfectly
elastic demand curve; indeed, our analysis assumes that the Rs do
face perfectly elastic demand curves (which, in economic theory,
are a necessary condition for perfectly competitive markets). By
definition, though, an industry does not face a perfectly elastic de-
mand curve, in that an industry is defined (over product, geography,
and time) in terms of intra- and inter-industry cross-elasticities of
demand.50 In short, a perfectly elastic demand curve for an industry
implies that there is a nearly perfect substitute for the product of
that industry. A near-perfect substitute, however, means that the
cross-elasticity of demand between the two products is very high
(that is, a price change in one product will raise sales of the other
significantly), so that both products ought to be defined as part of
50 [F]inns . . . in any sector tend to fall roughly into subgroups . . . so
that in each subgroup the outputs are relatively close substitutes for each
other and relatively distant substitutes for all other outputs. Each sub-
group is thus also a group of sellers potentially in more or less direct
competition with each other. Any such subgroup may be called an
industry.
J. B~A, ImusT-AL ORG AzATrO.-; 6 (2d ed. 1968) (emphasis in original).
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the same industry in the first place. We conclude, therefore, that
if the industry has been properly defined, the demand curve will
be neither perfectly elastic nor nearly so. Hence, the second limit
case is merely a theoretical possibility.51
In our third limit case, Figure 2(C), the supply curve for the-
industry is perfectly inelastic. The equilibrium will be unaffected
by a monopoly overcharge which increases P.- Perfect inelasticity
of supply supposes a product so limited in availability that no matter
what the price, the same quantity will always reach the market-
In such cases, the resellers would bear all of the price increase:
the rate of passing on would be zero. Note also that the level of
output is unchanged (Qr' = Q/'). Here, again, relevant real-
world examples are infrequent, though nearly perfect inelasticity of
supply can be illustrated by the existing stock of paintings of a
deceased master.
In our final limit case, Figure 2(D), the demand curve facing
industry R is perfectly inelastic. Here, all of the overcharge that
increases Pm will be passed on to C, regardless of the elasticity of
supply. Perfectly inelastic demand implies that within the relevant
range of prices, consumers will buy a fixed quantity of the product
regardless of any increase or decrease in price. Hence, even if a
reseller were to increase its price from P/r to P/', it would sell the
same quantity: the equilibrium output remains unchanged (Qr' =
Q 1). In this situation, if M imposes a monopoly overcharge, shift-
ing R's supply curve from S' to S" all of that price increase will be-
passed on by firms at R to C.
51 There are two potential exceptions to this statement. First, suppose that the
cartelization among M firms is less than complete, so that not all R firms are paying
the monopoly overcharge. Then, the firms that are paying the overcharge must
nevertheless continue to charge a market price determined by those that are not
because consumers would not pay a higher price when they could buy the same
product at a lower price. There is no reason why the R firms buying from cartel
members would not, in these circumstances, seek out and purchase from M firms
that are not members of the cartel.
The second possibility arises from different production technologies within the
same industry (as defined in terms of output). Suppose that R firms manufacture
a product, Z, and that some R firms use X as the basic input while others use Y
(for instance, the product might be wrapping materials, produced either from
aluminum or petrochemicals). In that event, a price-fixing conspiracy among the
makers of X would raise the costs of some R firms but not affect the costs of the
others. If the Z produced from Y is a very close substitute for Z produced from
X, the R(X) firms would face a highly elastic demand curve and, in the short run
at least, would have to absorb the monopoly overcharge rather than pass it on.
If this were the case, though, there would then be a significant drop in the sales
of the R(X) firms (who would be operating at a loss), which would in turn mean
a drop in sales of the firms producing (and fixing the price of) X. Since cartels
are likely to occur when elasticity of demand (in our example, for X) is low, cases
such as these are not likely to occur frequently. See note 54 infra & accompanying
text.
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While perfectly inelastic demand curves may be uncommon,
highly inelastic demand is not. One can imagine no more poignant
example than the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) cartel: virtually all of the derivative products of crude
petroleum-gasoline, diesel fuel, kerosene (for jet aircraft), and home
heating oil have highly inelastic demand. Indeed, it is precisely
because demand is so inelastic that OPEC has been able to raise its
prices so high with so little effect upon the quantity of petroleum
sold.
4. Probable Monopoly Market Characteristics
Under the conditions assumed here-that R is on a competitive
level with profit-maximizing firms-the rate of passing on in the
short run is a function of the relative elasticities of supply and
demand.52 The higher the elasticity of supply relative to demand,
the greater is the percentage of the overcharge which will be passed
on by the direct purchaser to indirect purchasers; conversely, the
lower the elasticity of supply relative to demand, the lower is the
percentage passed on. Given that the models allow for extreme
results (varying from no passing on to total passing on) and that
the results depend upon elasticities (about which there is seldom
precise data), it is sometimes argued that the theoretical analysis
demonstrates the difficulty of handling passing-on issues through the
judicial process.
This contention-that proving passing on in an actual case is
difficult and costly at best-is deficient on three distinct grounds.
First, in emphasizing the wide range of results obtained from hypo-
thetically possible supply-demand relationships, the argument
ignores the probable relationship between supply and demand in
markets in which monopoly overcharges are likely to occur and
passing-on problems are likely to be presented. Second, in focusing
on short-run analysis, the argument takes no account of the adjust-
ments made by producers and consumers over time. As we show
in the next section, long-run analysis changes the picture dramat-
5 The rate of passing on, RPO, is defined as
e
S
RPO -
e +-e
S D
where e is the elasticity of supply and e is the elasticity of demand. Thus, to
S D
refer to Figure 2 once again, supply is perfectly elastic in case 2(A), so
- = co --> RPO = 1.00 (100%). Likewise, when demand is perfectly inelastic
S
<Figure 2(D)), e 0 , so whatever the value of e , RPO = 1.00.D S.
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ically, and in many market situations, even long-run (that is, capital-
investment or capacity) adjustments can be made quite rapidly--
certainly, in markets such as the retail industry, well within the
time span over which a monopoly or successful cartel might main-
tain an overcharge. Third, that elasticities are relevant to the
theoretical analysis does not mean that precise measurement of
elasticities is the only way that passing on can be identified. In part
II we show that there are empirical indicia of passing on, and in
part III we demonstrate that these, along with plausible judgments
about the general level of elasticities, can be used to develop rea-
sonable presumptions about passing on. First, though, let us re-
main within the present theoretical universe and examine the prob-
able short-run relationship between supply and demand in situations.
in which monopoly overcharges are likely to be encountered.
Remember that we are dealing with at least a three-level chain
of distribution: manufacturers, resellers, and consumers. In this
situation, the direct purchasers have a derived demand for the out-
put of M-that is, R's demand for Qm is derived from the demand
of the final consumers, C.rs Accordingly, the elasticity of demand
by R firms for Q. depends upon the elasticity of demand by C
households or firms for Qr When the product sold in the two
sequential markets is identical (say, bread sold first by a commercial
bakery to a retailer and then by the retailer to households), there
is a near identity between the respective elasticities. Even when
the product is transformed physically by the intermediary (say, flour
sold to a retail baker and bread products sold by the baker to house-
holds), there remains a strong functional relationship between the
elasticities of direct and derived demand.54
Remember also that the initial price increase, P, is the result
of an antitrust violation: it is an exercise of power by a cartel (or
a monopolist) to raise Pm above the competitive level. The profit-
53 "Consumers purchase commodities because they derive satisfaction from
them. Inputs are purchased for the sake of the contribution they make to produc-
tion." J. HE-DERSON & R. QUANDT, MICnOECONOMIC THEonY 127 (2d ed. 1971).
"The producer's input demands are derived from the underlying demand for the
commodity which he produces." Id. 69. When the "producer" is merely a reseller,
the "input" is identical to the "commodity which he produces."
54The demand factor which is most important to the relationship between
direct and derived demand is the degree of factor substitutability. If there are
readily available substitutes for an input, the producer has a very elastic demand
for that input even though the final demand for its output is very inelastic. If, for
example, a producer can easily substitute plastic fasteners in the production process,
its demand for metal fasteners would be high, whatever the elasticity of demand
for its finished product. Again, in the case of a reseller, the input is the output,
which means a very low rate of substitutability.
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ability of such an anticompetitive practice depends upon the
elasticity of demand confronting the would-be violators; the less
elastic the demand, the more profitable will be cartelization (or
monopolization); the more elastic the demand, the less profitable
it will be. This is because the demand elasticity at the current
competitive price specifies the rate at which the cartel or monopolist
at M will lose sales as prices for the product are raised above com-
petitive levels. Indeed, in the limit case in which the demand for
Q. is perfectly elastic, it is theoretically impossible for the firm or
firms at M to raise the price above the competitive level because
there is one, and only one, price at which manufacturers will be
able to sell their product at all.
No antitrust passing-on problem can exist unless a cartel (or
monopolist) has succeeded in raising prices above the competitive
level-that is, unless there is a monopoly overcharge which may or
may not be passed on. Given the relationship between elasticities
and the potential for and profitability of cartelization or mo-
nopolization, however, the very existence of a supracompetitive
price forcefully implies that the elasticity of demand for Q. is not
high. Because that elasticity derives from the elasticity of demand
for Qr, we know that in all probability the demand curve facing
firm at R is not highly elastic either. In short, the case portrayed
in Figure 2(B), or any case approaching this limit, is highly un-
likely to occur in any market in which a monopoly overcharge is
being imposed. As a practical matter, situations in which direct
rather than indirect purchasers bear all or most of the costs of an
increase in Pm because of demand-supply relationships like those
identified in Figure 2(B) will simply not occur when the cause of
the price increase is a monopoly overcharge.
On the other hand, although perfectly inelastic demand curves,
as shown in Figure 2(D), do sometimes exist, the point here is
more general. Cartelization and monopolization-and, hence,
monopoly overcharges-are most likely to be achieved and to persist
in intermediate markets characterized by relatively inelastic de-
mand because the potential for supracompetitive profits is greatest
in these markets. It is in precisely these markets, however, that the
higher prices paid by direct purchasers will, as a rule, be passed on
to indirect purchasers, even in the short run.
The other limit case in which, according to the short-run
variable-cost analysis, direct purchasers pass on none of the price
increase by M is that depicted in Figure 2(C), in which the supply
curve is perfectly inelastic. Situations at or near this limit can be
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imagined-for example, Picasso paintings and Ming Dynasty arti-
facts-but, as a practical matter, supply curves even approaching
the vertical seldom occur in the commercial world which concerns
us here.a5 So, again, the extreme case in which indirect purchasers
bear little or none of an increase in variable costs through passing
on is little more than a theoretical nicety.
Although inelastic supply curves are uncommon, highly elastic
supply curves which approach the limit case in Figure 2(A) are very
common. All that a highly elastic supply curve implies is that the
reseller can increase sales with no significant increase in costs. That
will often be true for retailers and wholesalers because they can
typically buy larger quantities at the same price (or, with volume
discounts, a lower price). Since cases like or approaching that in
Figure 2(A) entail a high rate of passing on, even in the short run,
it appears that supply elasticities conducive to passing on are also
those most likely to be encountered in many real-world markets.
When cartelization or monopolization occurs in manufacturing or
processing, it will be precisely these resellers-the ones most likely
to be able to pass on-who will be the direct purchasers and first-
level indirect purchasers through whom the monopolized products
will pass from the cartel or monopoly to the final consumer.
Let us summarize the short-run results when the reseller
operates in a competitive market. If the monopoly overcharge in-
creasing Pm raises the fixed costs of R but does not affect variable
costs, the model indicates that the price increase will not be passed
on to C. When Pm affects variable costs (that is, shifts the supply
curve upward), the rate of passing on depends upon the relationship
between supply and demand. Given the probable elasticities of
supply and demand in markets in which monopoly overcharges are
likely to be encountered, the model suggests that, even in the short
run, the rate of passing on is likely to be high in most instances.
B. Long-Run Analysis When All Downstream Markets
Are Competitive
The results of the preceding section indicate that in many situa-
tions a high degree of passing on is likely to occur even in the short
55 Even "Picassos" are not strictly limited in supply (that is, the supply curve
is not perfectly inelastic). As is widely known among art dealers and collectors,
rising prices of even deceased artists have the almost certain effect of increasing
the supply of his or her work, or, shall we say, of "close substitutes."
There is an important restriction that induces inelasticity of supply. In a case
in which there is a scarcity of natural resources (for example, land and fossil fuels)
and in which those resources represent a large share of the total cost of production,
the supply curve is likely to be less than perfectly elastic.
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run. In other cases, however, direct purchasers may bear all or
part of the monopoly overcharge. The analysis above, however,
takes no account of the long-run adjustments likely to be made by
producers and consumers in response to a monopoly overcharge.
This is no small fault, considering that discovering, prosecuting,
and remedying antitrust violations is a time-consuming process and
that successful cartelization or monopolization often endures over a
very long period. Continuing to assume that R is a competitive
market with profit-maximizing firms, we turn, therefore, to an exam-
ination of long-run equilibrium.
It is a basic axiom of economic theory that the elasticity of
supply or demand is time-dependent. As time passes, firms at all
levels and ultimate consumers have greater opportunities to respond
to changes in prices, substitutes, technology, or tastes and have
greater flexibility in doing so. Over the long run, consumers gain
additional information regarding price, quality, and availability of
substitutes. Consequently, elasticity of ultimate (and related de-
rived) demand becomes increasingly elastic as the time dimension
is extended. In response to an increase in the price of gasoline,
for example, consumers might respond initially by buying the same
quantity, but consumption would likely be reduced in the long run
as consumers switched to smaller and more fuel-efficient automobiles.
In that case, demand for gasoline is highly inelastic in the short run
but more elastic in the long run.
Similarly, supply elasticity is highly time-dependent. Just as
the short-run marginal-cost curve in a competitive market represents
the short-run supply curve, so the long-run marginal-cost curve in
such a market represents the long-run supply curve. In the long
run, however, all production costs are variable: the producer can
adjust capacity, production techniques, and marketing strategy in
response to changing market conditions. For this reason, supply
will, in the long run, be highly elastic, while the supply curve will
be flat, or nearly so.57 This is not a matter of idle speculation or
5 6An empirical analysis of 49 price-fixing cases brought and won by the Anti-
trust Division in the period from 1971 to 1976 found the average duration of those
conspiracies to be 5.5 years. By any reasonable standard, five-and-a-half years is
the long run, in terms of the appropriate economic model. M. Block, H. Demmert
& F. Nold, An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants and Impact of Class
Action Activity: A Proposal (1979) (Center for Econometric Studies of the Justice
System, Hoover Institution, Stanford University).
57 But see J. HENDEBSON & R. Quart, supra note 53, at 118 ("Long run
supply curves are not always horizontal. The supply curve will be upward sloping
if firms do not have identical cost functions and there are no offsetting external
economies."). If an industry does not face constant costs, the factor of increasing
costs can be readily added to the inquiry. See part IV(A) (4) infra.
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abstract theorizing; virtually every empirical study of industry cost
functions has found that, in most industries, marginal and average
costs are equal and identical over the relevant range of output in
the long run.5
In Figure 3 we have illustrated the long-run adjustments by R
in response to a monopoly overcharge imposed by M. Figure 3(A)
indicates both the short- and long-run supply curves of firms at level
R. (We have shown an upward-sloped short-run supply curve; if
the short-run supply curve were flat, 100% of APm would be passed
on, so we would not need to examine the long-run results.) Note
that APm, the overcharge imposed by M, shifts both the short- and
long-run supply curves, but that, in the short run, the equilibrium
price and output are determined by the intersection of S" and D.
The rate of passing on is, in the short run, less than 100% because
AP, is less than APm. That result will not continue over the long
run, however. In the short run, the R firms find that at Q/', Pr- is
less than the long-run average cost, so they are operating at a loss.
In order to stop the resulting losses, the R firms will make adjust-
ments that will bring costs into line with the market-clearing price.
These adjustments may include reduction in inventory or in invest-
ment level, and hence in capacity. Exit from the industry may even
be necessary if no lesser adjustment will stanch the flow of losses.
The long-run equilibrium result is shown in Figure 3(B).59 In
accordance with our comments regarding the time elasticity of de-
mand, the demand curve has been shown to be more elastic in the
long-run illustration. Nevertheless, when the long-run supply curve
is flat, 0 the elasticity of demand is irrelevant to the rate of passing
58The classic study of industry-cost relationships is J. BAw, BAMUEns To NEw
COMPETITIoN (1956). It is important to distinguish between firm and industry
costs. Many observers have speculated (though little empirical substantiation has
been presented) that, because of "managerial diseconomies of scale," the long-run
cost curve of an individual firm may increase at some point. Our analysis depends
upon the cost curve of an entire industry, to which, presumably, managerial dis-
economies do not apply.
59 By showing the change in the long-run marginal-cost curve from LRMC' to
LRMC" as exactly equal to the monopoly overcharge, APn, we have implicitly
assumed away the possibility of factor substitution by R. It is conceivable that, by
modifying the production process to use less Qr to produce a given quantity of
Qr, the change in LRMC would be less than APrIn The possibility of significant
factor substitution by R implies an elastic demand curve between R and M, in
which case monopolistic pricing is highly improbable. Hence, it is reasonable to
assume that factor substitution is relatively low in passing-on cases.
60 When the long-run supply curve is only nearly flat, the elasticity of demand
is relevant to determining the rate of passing on. See part IV(A) (5) infra.
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COMPARISON OF SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIA,
COMPE=TIVE CASE.
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on, which will, in any event, be complete."1 Note also that the re-
duction in output in the long run is greater than in the short run
because of the higher elasticity of both supply and demand in the
long run. Thus, in the long run both the allocative effects (reduced
output) and the distributive effects (excessive prices) are more oner-
ous for final consumers.
Notice that in both the short- and long-run analysis, supply
elasticity tends to be of great importance. Indeed, in the long run
it is of dominating importance. This rather striking implication of
standard economic theory as applied to passing on has been com-
monly overlooked by analysts who have insisted that both supply and
demand factors must be considered,"a and who seem to have sup-
posed that both could vary through the complete range from perfect
elasticity to perfect inelasticity, yielding innumerable permutations
affecting the passing-on rate. What our emphasis on the supply side
shows is that, in most cases, demand factors are relatively unimpor-
tant. Given what is known about the nature of cost functions in
most industries, we can state categorically that, as a general rule, all
monopoly overcharges to direct purchasers who simply resell the
manufactured product will in the long run be passed on to the in-
direct purchasers who consume the product. Inasmuch as anticom-
petitive practices of short duration are seldom discovered, much less
prosecuted, this generalization can be taken to cover all or most
cases in which overcharge litigation occurs. For purposes of anti-
trust enforcement, it is the longer run that matters most, and the
longer the run, the more likely that the rate of passing on will
be 100%.
01 The long-run equilibrium price and output are shown as Pr" and Qr".
Because Pr" - Pr' = APvn, the rate of passing on is 100%. Note that this result
applies whether the price increase from M affects fixed or variable costs. In either
case, the long-run marginal-cost curve will shift up by an amount exactly equal to
the change in Pv. Put simply, there are no fixed costs in the long run; if all costs
are variable and constant per unit of output, the effect of APrn will be the same
whether the product is a capital asset or an input that is consumed during the
production of one unit of output.
6la Editors' note: The lettered footnotes contain some of the material added
by the authors to take account of an economic analysis of the rule of Illinois Brick,
Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the
Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CnL L.
REv. 602 (1979), published just before this Article went to press.
In Landes & Posner, supra, it is argued that empirical analysis of passing on is
always difficult because estimates of elasticities of both supply and demand are
always required. In fact, when either elasticity takes an extreme value, knowledge
of the other elasticity is not required, as shown in our discussion in part I(A) (3)
supra. Landes and Posner compound this error by presenting only a short-run
analysis. Because in the long run supply is likely to be perfectly elastic (and when
it is not, it will be readily apparent), an estimate of elasticity of demand will rarely
be required for a long-run analysis.
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C. Short- and Long-Run Analysis When All Downstream
Markets Are Not Competitive
Up to this point, we have assumed in both the short-run and
long-run analyses that competition prevails among the resellers,
signifying that profit maximization by a firm at the R level induces
marginal-cost pricing. If, instead, the reseller possesses some degree
of market power, its marginal-revenue curve will lie below the
demand curve,62 in which case the profit-maximizing price will ex-
ceed marginal cost. In short, if the reseller has market power, the
supply curve is not equivalent to the short-run marginal-cost curve,
and the analysis must be modified.
Figure 4 shows the short-run and long-run equilibria when R
is a single-firm monopoly.08 The monopolist maximizes profit by
choosing the output level at which marginal cost is equal to marginal
revenue and then charging "what the market will bear" for that
level of output. Price is thus set at the level determined by the
intersection of the quantity line and the demand curve. The more
inelastic the demand, the greater is the divergence of price from
marginal cost.
In Figure 4(A), the original equilibrium price and output are
P/r and Q7. Assuming a shift in the reseller's short-run marginal-
cost curve, from SRMC' to SRMC", due to an overcharge by M
affecting the variable costs, the reseller reduces output to Qr" and
raises price to Pr- in the short run. The rate of passing on is con-
siderably less than 100% because Pr- minus P/r is much less than
AP .
In the long run, when the marginal-cost curve is perfectly
elastic (Figure 4(B)), or nearly so, the monopolist, R, passes on a
larger share of the price increase, but still less than 100%." The
irony of monopoly power at two levels is that whereas the competi-
tive reseller is forced by market pressures to pass on all or most -o
62A demand curve is equivalent to an average-revenue curve: for a given
level of output, the average revenue is equal to the total revenue from the sale
of that output, divided by the units of output. The marginal-revenue curve rep-
resents the additional revenues that would be received by selling one more unit of
output. If, and only if, the average-revenue curve is flat (demand is perfectly
elastic), marginal revenue is equal to average revenue. If the demand curve is
downward sloping, the marginal-revenue curve will lie below it.
3The results shown in Figure 4 are generalizable to cases in which there is
more than one firm, but each possesses some degree of market power. The critical
assumption is that each individual firm in the industry R faces a demand curve
that is not perfectly elastic, as it is in the competitive case.
64The long-run equilibrium positions for the monopolist are shown in Figure
4(B) as Pr* and Qr*. Because Pr* - Pr' < APnm the rate of passing on is less
than 100%.
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the price increase, the profit-maximizing monopolist-reseller may
rationally absorb a part of the overcharge first imposed by the cartel
or monopolist at a higher level.
Although in particular cases one can judge these matters on the
basis of industry structure, it is difficult to generalize about the
probable existence of market power held by a direct purchaser in
potential passing-on situations. In many production-distribution
chains, as we have noted earlier, resellers will be wholesalers or re-
tailers who are unlikely to wield very much market power. Re-
sellers in more complex chains, however, may include manufacturers,
processors, and others who may cartelize, or may already have car-
telized, to obtain market power.
Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that, other things being
equal, the greater the market power of direct purchasers at level R,
the more difficult it will be for firms at level M to impose a
monopoly overcharge in the first instance. Power at level R which
could be used when selling to level C would in most cases imply
countervailing power which could be used defensively against M's
effort to impose an overcharge. Hence, price fixing and other anti-
competitive practices by sellers high on the chain may be less likely
when resellers lower on the chain themselves have sufficient power
to impose an overcharge. Indeed, one must conclude that, at the
very least, the amount of the overcharge imposed high on the chain
in such situations will be smaller than it would have been if no
countervailing power were encountered. This would also be the
result of a "bargain" between firms with power at each level con-
cerning sharing of the proceeds of the total, profit-maximizing over-
charge imposed on consumers. In some cases, of course, market
power at the intermediate level reflects vertical restraints imposed
at the prior level.65 In those cases, we would also expect some
degree of joint profit-maximizing by the two levels of the distribu-
tion chain.
Although the possibility that power at the resale level may in
particular cases reduce the rate of passing on achieved at that level,
on the whole those business entities most likely to stand between
consumers and cartelists (or monopolists)-that is, retail stores,
wholesalers, contractors, and service firms-tend to be highly com-
petitive (if unaided by vertical restraints or collusive practices which
themselves violate antitrust laws). So, although monopoly may re-
sult from incomplete passing on in some cases, these cases can be
(M These restraints may not by themselves violate the antitrust laws; consider,
for example, exclusive wholesaling territories imposed by manufacturers. See
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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expected to be a distinct minority and to display structural features
differentiating them from the more typical case.
D. Analysis of Passing Back
There remains one last exercise in our theoretical review: an
analysis of the effects of a damage award to a direct purchaser upon
the price charged to indirect purchasers. This analysis is relevant
to the issue of compensatory justice in antitrust policy: to the extent
that an overcharge is passed on to indirect purchasers, these pur-
chasers should justly receive a corresponding share of overcharge
damages collected from the violator. If one were to conclude, how-
ever, that an award of overcharge damages to the direct purchaser
would be "passed back" down the distribution chain, in much the
same pattern as the overcharge has been passed on, then this goal
of compensatory justice could be met by assigning the entire cause
of action to the first purchaser. Unfortunately, analysis persuades
that this will not occur. If indirect purchasers are to be compen-
sated, other mechanisms must in most instances be found.
Again, we draw upon tax-incidence theory for the analysis.
Interestingly enough, the award of damages by a court is exactly
analogous to a "lump-sum tax," which is a tax that is not related
to any specific measure of economic performance. 66 The lump-sum
tax has the advantage-unique among all known forms of taxation-
of not inducing any allocative inefficiency because it does not affect
price or levels of output. The burden of a lump-sum tax, then, is
directly upon the payer of the tax: there is no mechanism for shift-
ing the tax to someone else. The result is similar with a "lump-sum
damage award": subject to one minor qualification, it is virtually
certain that no part of the award will find its way to the indirect
purchasers who bore part or all of the offensive price increase.
67
06 The most commonly cited example of a lump-sum tax is the "head tax," a
tax levied on each individual regardless of income or wealth. Lump-sum taxes "are
of considerable analytical interest since they do not give rise to an 'excess burden,'
but they are not of major quantitative importance. Nor should they be since they
are not acceptable on equity grounds." R. Musc=vE and P. MusGCrAVE, supra
note 33, at 211.
67 "Passing back" is zero because the damage award has no effect whatsoever
upon marginal costs, either in the short or long run. As a consequence, the profit-
maximizing price for the firm, whether competitive or monopolistic, is unchanged
by the award. If the direct purchaser passed on a significant share of the price
increase, the damage award is a "windfall profit." (The minor qualification refers
to publicly regulated utilities or similar enterprises, which might be required by.
administrative action to pass "windfall gains" back to their customers.)
This argument is critical to an understanding of the compensatory injustice of
Illinois Brick, and has been misapprehended by other commentators. See, e.g.,
Landes & Posner, supra note 61a. Landes and Posner, for example, claim that
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Regardless of the rate of passing on, the rate of passing back will
be zero.
The theoretical analysis is now complete. Its most salient
results bear directly on the policy issues faced by the Supreme Court
and Congress in dealing with passing on. The analysis demonstrates
that in markets likely to be characterized by monopoly overcharges,
direct purchasers who are not final consumers seldom bear any
significant part of the costs of antitrust-law violations. Direct
purchasers may be "closer" to the violation in some superficial
sense, but markets are highly interdependent. Furthermore, part
II will show that when we relax some of the restrictive assumptions
required for the preceding analytical models and thus account for
actual commercial pricing practices, these implications about the
frequency of passing on are strengthened rather than weakened.
To that matter we now turn.
II. COMMERCIAL PRICING PRACTICE AND PASSING ON
When one is aggregating across a sufficiently large number of
firms, marginal analysis of the kind employed in part I can be a
useful tool for understanding business pricing behavior. It need
not be literally true that each and every firm instantaneously adjusts
price to marginal costs. If the "law of large numbers" is applicable
and pertinent models are carefully selected, the profit-maximizing,
marginal-cost-pricing assumptions of neoclassical theory can sim-
plify analysis and reduce the amount of information required about
the behavior of individual enterprises while still providing useful
insights about the likely experience of most individual firms. Thus,
theory like that discussed in part I is indicative of the general scope
of the passing-on problem and could provide the basis for making
rebuttable presumptions about the extent of passing on in par-
ticular cases.
"indirect purchasers are compensated for relinquishing their legal claims [under the
Illinois Brick rule] by being charged lower prices [by direct purchasers]." Id. 606.
Unfortunately, Landes and Posner have confused marginal costs and fixed costs.
Profit-maximizing price is determined by marginal cost; because neither a damage
award nor the expected value of an anticipated damage award has any effect on
marginal cost, the price charged by the direct purchaser will be unaffected by the
assignment to that purchaser of the cause of action for the overcharge. Consider
a simple example: Company X receives (or anticipates) a check in the mail from
an unknown benefactor. There is no reason to suppose that as a consequence of
that windfall Company X will lower the price of its products. Courts could, of
course, order direct purchasers to lower prices over a period to redistribute recoveries
resulting from the Illinois Brick rule, but that would simply be an awkward, cy pres
method of obtaining the goal of compensatory justice-a goal more easily and
precisely obtained by reversing Illinois Brick.
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Yet, there are discrepancies between actual commercial pricing
practices and the strict assumptions of the marginal models. An
analysis better rooted in commercial practice against which to check
theoretical generalizations is therefore needed. Moreover, a method
of investigation in particular cases is still important, if only to
show how parties could challenge presumptions based on theory.
Something more explicit than an abstract model is thus desirable
in order to determine the behavior of particular firms in specific
market situations.
In section A of this part we review the deficiencies of the be-
havioral assumptions of the marginal-cost-pricing model and con-
sider the extent to which these may weaken the inferences we have
drawn from the theoretical analysis. There is an extensive em-
pirical literature-mainly surveys of managers-which collectively
shows that businesses seldom attempt actually to practice marginal-
cost pricing. We will attempt to explain why that is so and to
gauge its significance for the use of marginal analysis in the passing-
on issue.
We then examine in section B the most common commercial
pricing methods, markup and cost-plus pricing. Both of these are
based upon costs, but we also go on to survey how managers may
vary their pricing responses to take demand factors into account.
A. Differences Between Commercial Reality and Neoclassical
Assumptions About Pricing Practice
Virtually every study of actual pricing behavior of businesses
shows that managers do not typically follow the dictates of marginal-
cost pricing.68 This should come as no surprise: despite the formal
elegance of price theory in microeconomics, those models provide
few, if any, operational rules to guide actual pricing decisions.
Although the models may tell us something about aggregate busi-
ness behavior, they neither provide nor utilize norms or standards
which are discernible to, and useable by, individual decisionmakers
setting prices in a real market. In a commercial sense, the models
0 8 The seminal work challenging the descriptive validity of marginal-cost pric-
ing is that of Hall & Hitch, Price Theory and Business Behaviour, 2 OXFoRD EcoN.
Pxpmas 12 (1939). The Hall and Hitch study was based on interviews with 38
British businesses; the authors concluded that businessmen arrive at their prices as
the sum of "full costs" plus some allowance for profit-in other words, cost-plus
pricing. Further, confirming empirical studies were reported by J. DEAN, MAN-
AGERIL EcoNo~ncs (1951); A. OXENFELDT, INDUSTRAL PIuiCING AND hXET
PRACTICES (1951); and C. SAXTo,, Tim EcoNomIcS OF PRICE DETEMINATION
(1942). For a survey of the literature on this issue, see J. BLAM, EcoNoNIc
CONCENTRATION 467-97 (1972).
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are extremely limited. Among the most important limitations of
marginal-cost pricing are the following:
1. Marginal analysis assumes that individual firms are profit-
maximizing (or, more generally, that the current discounted value
of the firm is maximized). 9  As to many decisions-for example,
product design-there is no discernible explicit profit test, especially
for firms with market power. For instance, there is simply no way
to tell whether General Motors made more, or less, money by adding
tail fins to its cars in the 1960s. Pricing decisions, however, are most
intimately related to profits and, presumably, are rather rapidly
and precisely tested by the market. Nevertheless, there is some
doubt about whether pricing decisions are made, or at least always
made, to maximize profits. Herbert Simon has argued that human
cognitive limits may preclude serious efforts directed at maximizing
profits.70
Because of these limits, managers may develop a general norm
about the lowest acceptable profit rate; as long as the firm is ex-
ceeding this rate, adjustments are not indicated.7 1 Furthermore,
due to the separation of ownership from managerial control in large
corporations, managers may behave to satisfy or maximize their own
preferences rather than the interests of shareholders. If, for ex-
ample, managers attach high status to large sales revenues, they
might price below the profit-maximizing price in order to expand
sales. Similarly, managers no doubt make some decisions (especially
when market pressures are weak) with a view to minimizing po-
tential criticism rather than to maximizing profits.
7 2
09 Maximizing the value of the firm is equivalent to maximizing the present
discounted value of the lifetime profits of the firm.
70 This reflects the concept of "bounded rationality" introduced by Simon.
"The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems
is very small compared with the size of problems whose solution is required for
objectively rational behavior in the real world." H. SIMON, MoDELS oF MANu
198 (1957) (italics in original). The implication is that, even if managers want
to maximize profits, their limited capacity for rationality may prevent them from
doing so.
71 Whereas profit maximizing means seeking, finding, and obtaining the highest
possible level of profit, "satisficing," as this alternative policy is called, implies
that so long as profit exceeds some specified threshhold level (a "target rate of
return on investment"), managers will maintain their present course and policies.
Only if profit falls below the threshhold (fails to "satisfice") will managers initiate
remedial action. For an excellent review of choice behavioral models, see March,
Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of Choice, 9 BEL.L J. EcoN.
587 (1978).
72 Economists have long speculated and debated the appropriate "objective
function" of the firm (what it is that managers attempt to achieve). Possibilities
include size of the firm (employment), sales revenues, managerial status, minimum
managerial risk, and, of course, profits. The chief advantage of selecting profits
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2. Marginal-cost pricing normally requires for its implementa-
tion an enormous quantity of high quality information. Not only
must the firm have sophisticated cost data in order to link prices
precisely to marginal costs, but it must also estimate the precise
elasticity of demand (which is likely to change almost continuously)
for each of its products. Only very large companies with extensive
market-research capabilities could even consider developing infor-
mation systems approaching this level of sophistication.
3. Economic models typically exclude critical non-price vari-
ables in the marketing mix, such as spending on sales promotion or
advertising and building customer goodwill.
4. Marginal analyses seldom include the cost of price informa-
tion or the effects of this cost upon pricing decisions. Simply pro-
viding price information (for example, publishing catalogues and
price lists) may be costly. Also, customers may value price stability
(that is, less frequent, if larger, price increases), and this phe-
nomenon might cause managers to raise prices periodically rather
than immediately in response to increases in costs.
5. One purpose of pricing is to cover the costs of the firm, but
there are other, strategic, purposes served by pricing, most of which
are excluded from marginal analysis. The more important of these
include market pentration (introducing a product line into a new
market area), increasing market share, and establishing brand-name
identification or customer loyality.7 3 Thus, for strategic reasons,
firms may not price at the profit-maximizing level, at least in the
short run.
6. Marginal models neglect interdependence in production
costs or demand among products of a multiproduct firm, yet most
firms must constantly deal with these realities. On the demand side,
multiproduct firms may deliberately price below marginal cost on
some products as a strategy to increase sales of other products.
For example, bread or milk may be used as "loss leaders" in a
supermarket in order to increase the flow of customers to the store
as the firm objective is that it enables economists to derive deterministic results with
analytical models.
73Pricing, as taught in marketing-management courses by business schools, is
one of four key ingredients in the "marketing mix," which also includes product
design, communication (advertising, sales promotion), and distribution. Three
widely cited texts in pricing, which present normative standards for commercial
pricing policies, are R. LYNN, PRIcING Poucms AND MA TNG MANAGECENT
(1967); PRicING STRATEGY (B. Taylor & G. Wills eds. 1969); and I. VmNoN &
C. LAMB, Tim Pc ciN FUNCTION (1976).
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and, consequently, the sales revenues from other products. Even
more important is the interdependence among products on the
supply side. A large share of the total costs of a multiproduct firm
is not directly attributable to the production or sale of a specific
product. Examples of such "joint costs" include salaries paid to
top management, capital equipment used to produce more than
one product (a cash register in a retail store), and capital investment
in physical plant (the parking lot of a grocery store). By definition,
it is impossible to relate these costs accurately to a specific product
line, much less to a particular unit of the product line.
When joint costs exist-and they almost always do in a multi-
product firm-any cost-accounting assignment of a portion of the
joint cost to a particular product is arbitrary. Moreover, the joint
cost will not vary in a direct way with marginal increases or de-
creases in the production of any one product considered alone.
Hence, when joint costs are encountered, marginal costs-the minute
costs associated with the minute changes in the output of the product
in question-are always less than average costs. 4 Thus, if marginal-
cost pricing were literally and successfully practiced for products
with joint costs, that pricing method would produce revenues below
total costs and the firm would fail to earn a normal profit. Because
hundreds of thousands of multiproduct firms (mainly retail stores
and service establishments) do in fact earn normal profits, we know
that their prices are not equal to marginal costs.
B. Markup Pricing and Cost-Plus Pricing
The numerous deficiencies of marginal-cost pricing and the
power of commercial traditions and customs have their effects: very
few enterprises actually attempt to practice it. The vast empirical
literature on pricing practices 75 establishes that most businesses 6
74 Average costs, by economic definition, include a normal return on capital
investment (alternatively stated, the cost of capital is part of average cost). Thus,
by economic standards, if total revenues are exactly equal to total expenditures, the
firm is earning a normal rate of profit. By accounting definitions (the kind used
by most enterprises), capital costs are not included in total costs, so profits are
defined as the difference between total revenues and total costs.
75 The best source of information regarding pricing practices within indus-
tries is trade journals, which contain surprisingly frank descriptions of these practices.
That literature is, to put it mildly, voluminous. For exemplary review articles on
commercial pricing policies, see Christopherson, Product Pricing in the Chemical
Industry, FinANcr.L ANALYSTs J., Nov.-Dec., 1977, at 54; Hampel, Pricing Policies
and Profitability, MANAGEMNT AccoUNn=G, July, 1977, at 53; Knobloch, Pricing
for Profit, SAL~s & MAmTwNG MANAGmmNT, Sept. 19, 1977, at 72; Monroe &
Della Bitta, Models for Pricing Decisions, 15 J. MAxMxr= lEsxRcncH 413 (1978).
76 We are speaking in relative terms. There are, according to the Department
of Commerce, more than ten million proprietorships, one million partnerships, and
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employ some variation of one of two basic methods: markup pricing
or cost-plus pricing. In a survey of pricing practices, Alpert con-
cludes that "markup pricing is probably the single most widely used
approach in the setting of prices by wholesalers. Manufacturers, on
the other hand, are more likely to use a closely related method of
cost-plus pricing." 7 Most retail establishments use markup pric-
ing, while most contractors use the cost-plus approach. 78
In order to describe these pricing practices, it is necessary to
distinguish between direct and indirect costs. A direct cost (loosely
analogous to the variable cost dealt with in the theoretical literature)
is one that can be related to the production of a specific product or
group of products. In a manufacturing context, direct costs include
product-specific production labor, raw materials, maintenance and
depreciation costs of product-specific capital equipment, and
product-specific selling expenses (such as sales commissions). In-
direct costs in manufacturing include administrative overhead (in-
cluding clerical, shipping, and other non-product-specific labor
costs), managerial salaries, general selling expenses, and capital costs.
In retailing or wholesaling, direct costs are invoice costs (for in-
stance, the price paid for an item to the supplier); almost all other
expenses, not being specific to any one product or group, are treated
as indirect costs.
9
Markup pricing is based upon the facts that, for wholesalers and
retailers, the direct cost of a product is its invoice cost 80 and few
additional expenses can be directly attributed to any specific product
category. The resale price is determined by a more or less standard
markup over the invoice cost, which markup is intended to cover a
reasonable portion of the indirect costs of the firm and also to yield
a reasonable profit. The size of the markup for particular products
or groups of products tends to be standardized in an industry or
region and to become a matter of custom widely known to those in
the trade. To illustrate, if an item costs $10 per unit, and the
nearly two million corporations in the United States. U.S. DEP'T oF COMMEMCE,
STATISTICAL ABS'rACT OF THE UNrrED STATES 507 (1976). Many businesses, of
course-if only a small percentage of the total-use other kinds of pricing methods.
77M. AIF'T, PIUCING DECiSIONS 25 (1971).
78 For an excellent review of retail-pricing theory and empirical evidence re-
garding markup rates used by retail food stores, see L. PFESTON, PRoFrrs, COMPE-
TION AND RuLEs oF THUMB IN RETAIL FOOD PmciNG (1963).
79The specification of direct costs depends entirely upon the sophistication of
the information and accounting system utilized by the firm. The more data are
kept, the more costs there are which can be assigned as direct costs. Hence, there
is no single definition of direct costs.
50 Invoice cost is the unit cost paid by the retailer or wholesaler to its sup-
plier. See L. PRESTON, supra note 78, at 5.
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standard markup in that product class is 50%, the price would be
set at $15. The markup rate may vary within an industry from
one product or group of products to another and may be varied by
a particular firm to reflect current market conditions, inventory
levels, profits, and a number of "subjective" factors decided by the
price setter of the firm. Typically, though, markup rates closely
adhere to a discernible standard and do not vary in the short run."'
In an important variant of the markup-pricing system, practiced
widely at the retail level,82 the manufacturer (or, less frequently, the
wholesaler) sets both the invoice cost and the resale price, thereby
effectively determining the markup rate.s3 For example, a clothing
manufacturer might offer sweaters intended to retail for $40 at an
invoice price of $20.75. If the retailer accepts the suggested retail
price, it realizes a markup of 93%. In order for suggested retail
prices to gain wide acceptance, there must be a rough congruence
between the markup rate implied by the respective invoice and
retail prices and the markup rate common in that line of commerce.
It is important to note that characteristic of markup pricing
which distinguishes it from cost-plus pricing: the firm makes no
attempt to allocate indirect costs to each product line. Rather, it
is assumed that at the appropriate mix of capacity (selling space),
sales personnel, inventory, and advertising, the effective markup
rates will produce revenues adequate to cover direct and indirect
costs, including a reasonable profit.
By contrast, a cost-plus pricing system, such as that used by
most manufacturers and contractors, involves a deliberate cost-
allocation process. First, accounting information is used to allocate
to each product or group all of the costs that can be associated with
the production of one unit of that product; these are direct costs.
Then, a share of all indirect costs incurred by the firm is also allo-
cated to each product or group. Indirect costs may be apportioned
equally among all product lines or in the same ratio in which any
number of direct costs occur. For example, depreciation of a build-
ing may be allocated in a manner proportional to hours of direct
labor.
81 Only as it becomes evident that current markup rates are inadequate (costs
exceed revenues) or excessive (prices so high that business is lost) is it likely they
will be modified. Such information takes considerable time to develop.
82 Weltzien, Influence on Retail Prices, in PRCUNG PRACICES AND SrRAEGIEEs
24 (E. Bailey ed. 1978). Weltzien contends that, due to the rise of discount retail
stores and increased private labelling (that is, store brands), the influence of
manufacturers and wholesalers on retail prices is waning.
8 Given the law regarding resale-price maintenance, manufacturers must be
cautious in "suggesting" resale prices. It is nonetheless a common practice in
many retail trades. See id. 24.
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A hypothetical example will serve to illustrate the method more
fully. A firm produces two products, A and B. The direct costs of
A are $8 per unit, those of B, $20. The firm produces 200 units
of A and 100 units of B. Total indirect costs for the year (including
a targeted profit) are $1,500. If allocated at a fixed amount per
unit of output, each unit would be assigned $5 in indirect costs.
Accordingly, the price of A would be set at $13 ($8 in direct costs
plus $5 in indirect costs), while B would be priced at $25 ($20 plus
$5).84 Alternatively, the firm might apportion indirect costs as a
percentage of direct costs, in which case the price for A would be
set at $11.36, and that for B at $28.40. s5  There are a number of
other methods for measuring and assigning direct and indirect costs
-actual practices vary widely from industry to industry and, on oc-
casion, from firm to firm. Practices tend to be similar within in-
dustries, though: trade custom is a determinent of actual com-
mercial practice.86
Let us now consider the effects of these alternative pricing
techniques-markup and cost-plus-on the rate of passing on. We
revert to the scheme and terminology of part I, in which a cartel
(or monopolist) at the manufacturing level, M, sells to firms at level
R, which resell to final consumer, firms or households at level C.
We assume, for simplicity, that a price increase by M does not affect
the target rate of return for the firms at R.8 7 We also assume,
initially, that R firms use a cost-based pricing system and that de-
mand factors influence markup rates and the apportionment of
indirect costs only over the long run.88
84 If apportioned per unit, total indirect cost is divided by total units to
determine indirect cost per unit; in our example, $1500 divided by 300 units (200 of
A, 100 of B) equals $5 per unit.
85 If apportioned as a percentage of direct costs, total indirect cost is divided
by total direct cost to determine the percentage; in the example given, $1500 -
$3600 = 42%, so total cost for A is $8 + .42 X 8 = $11.36, for B, total cost is
$20 + .42 X 20 = $28.40. Note that total revenue is $5100 (200 X $11.36 for A,
plus 100 X $28.40 for B), which just covers total cost.
86 See, e.g., the authorities cited in notes 73, 75, & 77 supra.
87 This assumption is realistic if R is a competitive level. If it is not, adjust-
ments like those suggested theoretically in part I(C) might be worked out by
reductions in the target rate of R firms.
8 8 We are assuming that R does not change its purchases from M as a result
of the price increase. That would be true if there were no lower-cost substitutes
for Qm, or if R's production process was constrained by fixed factor proportions
(that is, X units of Qnt are required for every Y units of output, Qr). To the
extent that substitutes are available, the power of the cartel or monopoly at M will
be reduced, and the total amount of the overcharge will, over time, be reduced.
Unless factor substitutions involved slips between variable and fixed costs (an
unlikely consequence in most realistic situations), such substitutions by R firms
would not affect the rate at which the (now smaller) overcharge was passed on.
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Suppose first that the product manufactured by M and sold to
R constitutes an indirect cost to R. 9 (Office supplies used in clerical
functions would be an example.) What happens to pricing by R if
M imposes a monopoly overcharge? If R uses a markup pricing
system, none of the monopoly overcharge will be passed on in the
short run. Only if the increase in indirect costs forces R firms over
the long run to modify markup rates will the overcharge be passed
on to consumers. By contrast, if R uses cost-plus pricing, a
monopoly overcharge which increases indirect costs will be passed
on as soon as the firm recalculates indirect costs and reapportions
them among units of output. That might be done annually or even
more frequently. Suppose R has direct costs of $1,000 and indirect
costs of $500; then, because of a monopoly overcharge by M, indirect
costs go up to $600. If the firm produces 100 units, direct costs
remain constant at $10 per unit, while indirect costs increase from
$5 to $6 per unit. As soon as the firm recognizes the indirect-cost
increase, it presumably will raise its sales price from $15 to $16,
constituting a 100% rate of passing on.90
Consider next the effect of an increase in direct cost when a
markup pricing scheme is used. An example might be a sale of
canned goods to a supermarket. Imposing a monopoly overcharge,
M increases its invoice price from $10 to $12. The invoice price
is a direct cost for R, which uses a markup rate of 50%. R's price,
$15 before the increase, becomes $18 after the increase. A price
increase of $2 from M is transformed by the markup process to a
$3 increase for final consumers. In fact, as a general rule, the rate
of passing on of direct costs under markup pricing is equal to 100%
plus the markup rate of the firm. (In our example,. the rate of
passing on is equal to 100% plus 50%: the $3 change in Pr equals
150% of the $2 change in P.)
Now assume the overcharge increases direct cost but that a
cost-plus pricing method is used by R. A sale of radio tubes to a
firm which assembles amplifiers is an example. There are two pos-
sibilities. If indirect costs are apportioned by a fixed amount per
unit of output, the rate of passing on for a direct-cost overcharge
89 In most cases, it will be obvious whether a price increase affects direct or
indirect cost. If an item is resold, then by definition direct costs are affected.
When an item is used as an input into the production process, though, there is
some ambiguity involved; depending on accounting techniques, what is treated as
a direct cost of one firm (or industry) may be considered indirect cost by another.
90 Note that in a multiproduct firm, an increase in indirect cost will be passed
on in the prices of as many products as the firm produces. It is these cases where
the difficulties of determining and proving passing on are greatest.
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will be 100%. In the two-product firm example given above, 91
directs costs are $8 for A and $20 for B, indirects costs are $5 per
unit, and prices are set at $13 for A and $25 for B. If an overcharge
imposed by M raised direct costs for A to $9, then R's price for A
would be increased to $14-a 100% rate of passing on. If indirect
costs were apportioned relative to direct costs, however, then the $1
increase from $8 to $9 in the direct costs of A would also increase
the percentage of indirect costs borne by A and reduce the portion
of indirect costs borne by B. The price for A would therefore go
up by the full amount of the overcharge plus the amount by which
A's share of indirect costs was increased, a total increase of more
than 100% of the overcharge. By contrast, the price for B would
be unaffected by the increase in direct cost and would be reduced
on the new allocation since B would then bear a smaller percentage
of the unchanged indirect costs. In the example used above, the
post-overcharge price of A would be $12.55 and that of B, $27.90,
compared to pre-overcharge prices of $11.36 and $28.40, respectively.
For A, this implies a passing-on rate of 119%.92
Note that in no case of cost-plus or markup pricing thus far
considered has the rate of passing on been less than 100%. If we
abandon our assumption that only cost factors are being incor-
porated into pricing decisions and assume instead that firms also
include demand factors in setting specific prices, these results could
change somewhat. How might demand factors come into play? In
the short run, at least, a firm at R might decide to absorb some
of the overcharge imposed by M for fear of losing customers. Thus,
the "rigid application of cost-plus pricing margins [or markup
rates] is typically modified by businessmen to incorporate subjective
estimates of the price elasticity of demand, at various final prices
.... However, this is frequently not done in any systematic way." 93
Whether systematically or not, firms do sometimes take demand
considerations into account. Of course, if there was a monopoly
overcharge on a product for which R firms did not incur joint
costs, each R firm presumably would recognize that other R firms
91 See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
92 When a firm uses cost-plus pricing, produces a large number of products,
and apportions indirect costs as a percentage of direct cost, determination of passing
on would be difficult. Actually, though, we have overstated the difficulty by
implying in the example that an increase in direct cost of one product causes the
firm to recompute the cost-plus percentage. If firms recompute that percentage
periodically, not in response to each price change, the percentage does not change,
and cost-plus is equivalent to markup pricing in that the rate of passing on is
equal to 100% plus the cost-plus percentage.
93 M. AxrnrT, supra note 77, at 27-28.
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were experiencing the same cost increase. If, as would typically
occur, all R firms also used similar pricing methods, each would
realize that others were likely to respond to the cost increase by
passing it on. Hence, fear of loss to competing resellers would be
greatly reduced for each R firm. Nevertheless, a firm might alter
its pricing practice in light of subjective judgments about demand.
So, in our two-product manufacturing example with cost-plus pric-
ing, a firm might face much more competition in the market for A
than B and, accordingly, might respond to an overcharge by assign-
ing less of its indirect cost to A than to B.
In the perfectly competitive model, of course, prices are not
set by anyone: they are dictated by the market. If competitive
conditions-a large number of buyers and sellers, a homogeneous
product, and perfect information-exist, then any single firm must
charge the going market price if it wants to sell anything, no matter
what its costs. As is widely appreciated, though, competition is
seldom perfect. Prices often vary slightly among firms even in work-
ably competitive markets. Still, many instances approach the
ideal. If, for example, each of the retail stores in a market buys
at the same price (and for most name-brand products that will be
true) and uses the same markup rate (the function of trade cus-
tom), then they will "independently" arrive at the same "market"
price.
To summarize, most businesses begin the pricing exercise on
the cost side, measuring direct costs and apportioning indirect costs
by a a markup or cost-plus method. Demand factors are sometimes
taken into account, usually in a subjective way. Put simply, very
few businesses set prices by equating marginal cost to marginal rev-
enue. The consequent indeterminacy of commercial pricing prac-
tices has been cited to support the claim that it is difficult to esti-
mate the degree of passing on in a particular case. We will show
in part III that the difficulty is overstated. It is possible, on the
basis of theoretical insights reinforced by institutional knowledge,
to make very reasonable estimates of passing-on rates, and to do so
with limited amounts of data.
III. RECONCILING THE THEORETICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSES
While the review of institutional practice in part II tends to
reinforce the theoretical conclusions in part I, the possibility of
subjective responses to demand and other such factors suggests a
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greater range of possible pricing responses than the theoretical
models presuppose. In this part we evaluate the apparent varia-
tion and seek to reconcile the use of standard pricing techniques
with the implications of the theoretical models described in part I.
We show that, even though businesses may not intentionally price
at marginal cost, market pressures-acting through inventories, in-
vestment levels, and firm entry and exit-will, especially in work-
ably competitive markets, tend to bring prices into accord with
costs (or, alternatively, bring costs into line with prices). We note
a major exception to the tendency of markets to bring prices to
marginal-cost levels-the multiproduct firm, an enterprise which
sells a large number of different products which are "produced"
in a common facility. The most obvious and frequently en-
countered example of a multiproduct firm is a retail store, but the
term also describes most wholesale and service establishments, as
well as many manufacturing firms. This exception does not weaken
our theoretical conclusion about passing on, but strengthens it,
for, as we will show, the marginal model understates the rate of
passing on by multiproduct firms. Overall, this analysis of com-
merical pricing practices enhances the results of the marginal
analysis: it shows that a large share of a monopoly overcharge will,
in most cases, be passed on to indirect purchasers.
The standard defense of economists to attacks on the marginal-
price model is that business enterprises need not consciously price
at marginal cost in order for the model to be descriptive; rather,
it is necessary only that, however prices are set, the results induced
by those pricing practices and market forces be equivalent to mar-
ginal-cost pricing. If that sounds like a tortuous defense, consider
the following analogy. When a quarterback tosses a sixty-yard pass
to his flanker, he does not calculate the necessary trajectory (velocity
of target, angle of inclination, force applied to trajectile). Never-
theless, the outcome might be fairly modeled as if he had made
those calculations. Likewise, the price setter need not consciously
calculate marginal cost and revenue, but we might still characterize
behavior as if it did. The issue thus reduces to a simple question:
Under what circumstances is either markup or cost-plus pricing
equivalent to marginal-cost pricing? As we showed in part I,
marginal analysis suggests a high percentage of a monopoly over-
charge typically will be passed on in the short run and that a passing-
on rate approaching 100% will be the long-run norm. Thus, to the
extent that market forces press for equivalence between the results
suggested by marginal analysis and those achieved by conventional
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pricing practices, those instances in which the use of pricing con-
ventions would seem to lead to passing-on rates exceeding 100%,
will be rectified, as will any instances in which subjective judg-
ments about demand might tend to lead to a passing-on rate of less
than 100o.
We consider three possible cases in which the use of a con-
ventional pricing method would lead to an equivalence of price and
marginal cost, and a fourth in which reconciliation is not possible.
In the first case, costs and demand are such that markup pricing is
identical to marginal pricing. The conditions required are (1) that
unit costs of individual products are constant, so that the marginal
and average cost curves are flat and equal throughout the relevant
range of output, and (2) that the demand curve facing the firm for
that particular product is one of constant elasticity. If these condi-
tions apply, then a price set by a constant markup over unit cost
will always be the profit-maximizing price. Any shift in either cost
or demand does not change the appropriate markup rate as long
as the elasticities do not change.94 These are highly restrictive
conditions, however, that seldom occur in the commercial world.
The second way by which markup or cost-plus pricing might
be brought into equivalence with marginal-cost pricing is through
inventory changes which signal the need for, and result in, price
changes responsive to demand conditions. Suppose a firm normally
uses a standard markup pricing scheme to determine product price
and, initially takes no account of demand factors. If the price is
above the "correct" (market-clearing) price, the firm's inventory of
that product will rise above normal levels. (Alternatively stated,
the turnover rate of that product will decline.) In that event, the
firm may mark down the price or reduce the markup rate on that
product in order to maintain inventory or turnover rate at the de-
sired level. Similarly, if a price settler's subjective assessment of
demand assumes that demand is more elastic than in fact it is, so
that the price setter modifies its pricing method and absorbs part
of an overcharge to avoid loss of sales, the inventory corrective will
work in the other direction. The price setter, having set a price
9 4 Preston elaborates on the conditions required for markup pricing to be
profit maximizing. If the two conditions given in the text obtain, then
[l] MR = (1 + i1e) - F;
[2] MR = MC = AC; and
[3] P = AC - [I - 1/(I + e)],
where MR is marginal revenue, MC is marginal cost, AC is average cost, P is
price, and e is the elasticity of demand. Equation [3] states that if price is set
by a constant markup, price is equal to marginal cost. See L. PRESToN, supra
note 78.
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too low, will find turnover increasing and normal inventories too
rapidly diminished. Thus, even though the price setter a priori
makes no attempt to measure demand with precision and set price
at marginal cost, demand-working through inventory-may have
the effect of moving prices toward marginal cost. The responsive-
ness of prices will vary with the sophistication of the firm's inven-
tory and sales-information system.
The third way by which markup or cost-plus prices can be
brought into equivalence with marginal costs is through capacity
adjustments-that is, through changes in the level of investment in
productive facilities (such as manufacturing plants, wholesale ware-
houses, and retail selling space). Needless to say, these adjustments
require time: in the economist's lexicon they are long-run adjust-
ments. Companies do not-typically cannot-instantaneously change
capacity in response to changes in prices, costs, or other market
factors. Over the long run, however, the firms which make up an
industry either do adjust their capacity or find that the market
forces will do so through entry of new firms or forced exit.
If prevailing prices, as set by markup or cost-plus pricing
methods, exceed marginal costs and inventory adjustments fail to
revise prices sufficiently, there is an economic incentive for firms
to seek to increase their shares of the market to capture some of the
potential excess profit to be earned in the industry.95 The effort
to gain a larger share will take the form of increased promotional
activity, increases in capacity, and related activities, all of which
increase costs. Firms will continue to have incentives to engage
in such activities until costs are driven up to the point at which there
are no longer excess profits to be gained. Thus, if prices are not
driven down to marginal costs, costs will in the long run be driven
up to price. This is a well-known theoretical result of "monopolistic
competition" which characterizes most retail trades: because firms
have some small degree of locational advantage (or product dif-
ferentiation), excess capacity is induced and may persist over long
periods.96 If prices are held artificially high by resale-price main-
tenance (as with liquor) or government regulation (as with financial
95 We are assuming that marginal cost is equal to average cost (that is, the
industry is operating at an output level exceeding minimum optimal scale), so that
a price exceeding marginal cost implies excess profit.
96 Monopolistic competition was conceived in Sraffa, The Law of Returns
Under Competitive Conditions, 36 EcoN. J. 535 (1926), and developed in E.
CuBEmBLAiN, THE THEORY OF MoNosomsmc CoMPETmITON (1933) and J. ROB-
INSON, THE EcoNoNcS OF .IhmPErcT CoMPETIrON (1933). For a modem treat-
ment, see E. MANSFIELD, MicnowcoNomncs (1979).
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depository institutions),9 7 the problem of excess capacity is exacer-
bated.
If, alternatively, existing markup rates lead to prices less than
marginal costs, in the long run either firms will have to reduce
capacity voluntarily (by using fewer or smaller stores), or some firms
will be driven from the trade by bankruptcy. This is a powerful
force at the retail level and is one reason why so many new business
ventures fail. Because new retailers are likely to accept the tradi-
tional markup rates of their trades, almost irrespective of marginal
costs and revenues, the market does the "equilibrating" through
capacity adjustments.
Finally, there is the critical case of the multiproduct firm, in
which inventory or capacity-cost adjustments will not function well
as equilibrating forces. For reasons given earlier, marginal costs
are less than average costs in virtually all multiproduct firms. Thus,
it is not possible for markup prices to be identical to marginal costs:
one of the two necessary conditions stated in our first case does
not hold.
The second possibility-that inventory turnover rates will stimu-
late price changes so that marginal-cost pricing is approximated-
does exist for multiproduct firms. Even so, however, note the likely
dynamics: absent a sophisticated demand-monitoring information
system, and assuming that the overcharge imposed by M affects all
firms at level R, it is highly unlikely that imposition of the over-
charge will cause any R firm to modify its markup rate immediately.
If R does not change the markup rate, the rate of passing on will
be 100% plus the markup rate, as already shown. Only if, over the
longer run, a slower rate of turnover induces a change in the
markup rate, will the rate of passing on be less (and even then, it
may still be 100o or more). In any event, the initial, short-run
response of the direct purchaser is to pass on more than 100%; only
if there exists some operative inventory adjustment mechanism will
the passing on rate be reduced.
It is highly unlikely that capacity adjustment would play the
equilibrating role within a multiproduct firm. If M's overcharge
increases the price of a product which accounts for a small share of
the total sales of a multiproduct R, the markup price used by R
could differ substantially from marginal cost over a long period
without inducing any adjustment of the investment level in the
industry. So, although the marginal model may be fairly descriptive
97The "prices" of financial depositories are determined by government regu-
lation of the interest rates those institutions can pay depositors or charge borrowers.
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of multiproduct firms if we abstract away from specific product lines
(as by aggregating across specific products, measuring output in
some homogeneous sense), the model is deficient if we are concerned
with the price-cost relationship of a particular product.
This is a consequence of no small import because most whole-
salers, retailers, and service establishments-the enterprises with
whom consumers most often deal-are multiproduct firms offering a
very large number of products. Even specialty stores typically carry
at least several dozen different items; in grocery or department stores
the number may run to the thousands. It is quite possible-indeed,
probable-that markup rates would be unaffected by capacity ad-
justments or declining profit margins of such a firm. If so, then a
rate of passing on exceeding 100% could well be maintained, even
over the long runyla
To summarize, the evidence suggests that businesses seldom set
prices according to marginal costs as predicted by the economic
model. In some cases, under very restrictive conditions, markup or
cost-plus prices may be, coincidentally, equal to marginal cost. In
other cases, in response to lagging (or excessive) turnover rates or
unduly high (or low) inventory levels, prices may be marked down
(or up), or the markup rate reduced (or increased), thereby equi-
librating markup prices to marginal costs. Finally, and only over
the long run, market forces may induce changes in profit rates
and/or investment levels and thereby force prices into accord with
marginal costs. These market forces will be strongest in the case of
a single-product, competitive firm with little product differentiation
and no significant barriers to entry. For a multiproduct firm,
market-adjustment mechanisms may not be sufficient to equilibrate
price to cost, with the consequence that the rate of passing on may
exceed 100% even over the long run. That important exception
aside, marginal analysis is confirmed as a fairly accurate guide for
estimating the likelihood, speed, and rate of passing on. Moreover,
it is quite feasible in particular cases to gather relevant, standardized
empirical information about actual pricing methods from which the
extent of passing on can be accurately determined.
97a The possibility of a rate of passing on exceeding 100% is critical in assessing
the deterrent effect of alternative assignments of the cause of action for overcharge
damages. Landes and Posner, for example, assert that deterrence is maximized by
giving the cause of action to those purchasers most proximate to the violators,
because these will most likely be aware of the violation. Landes & Posner, supra
note 61a, at 608-15. That line of argument fails to recognize that direct purchasers
may actually benefit from the violation by passing on more than 100% of the
overcharge. Such purchasers may be loathe to give up this stream of certain-
revenue in exchange for the possibility of damage awards.
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IV. DETERMINING THE RATE OF PASSING ON IN PARTICULAR CASES
The analyses above show the probability of a high rate of
passing on in most cases. They also suggest ways in which passing
on can be accurately evaluated-ways which should be neither too
time-consuming, too expensive, nor too complex for use in litigation.
While theory suggests general principles to guide investigation,
institutional factors suggest how explicit, empirical investigations
can be carried out. To these matters we now turn.
A. Theoretical Guides to Measuring Passing On
Economic theory suggests principles which constrain pricing
behavior. These principles, together with information about com-
mercial pricing practices, facilitate reasonable estimation of the rate
of passing on in a specific situation in which an overcharge has been
imposed. In presenting these general propositions, we cautiously
note that they suffer the usual limitation of their genre: there are
exceptions to every rule. Exceptions notwithstanding, the simplicity
of these general rules is their most important message: reasonable
estimation of passing on which will closely approximate the truth in
the majority of cases requires no mystical powers or elaborate, ex-
tensive economic analysis. 98 In many cases, making such estimates
is a straightforward exercise.99
Before the incidence of an overcharge can be traced, one must
be able to identify the distribution chain and follow transactions
down the chain. Often, this presents no difficulty: the conventional
manufacturer-distributor-wholesaler-retailer-consumer chain is likely
to be obvious, as is the manufacturer-distributor-subcontractor-
contractor-owner chain. If one starts higher up, above the manu-
facturer, with a raw-material producer or the manufacturer of a
sub-assembly, the matter is slightly more complex, yet still manage-
able. Nonetheless, there are chains that become hopelessly obscure.
When these are encountered, tracing beyond the point at which
obscurity sets in is impossible.
98We do not suggest that determining passing on is not exceedingly compli-
cated in some cases. Our point is that, whereas some have suggested that is the
usual, we think it is not. If the passing-on problem is thought difficult, compare
this line of analysis to others commonly trod by courts-measuring the value of
a human life, for example.
99Useful for comparison is the well-developed theoretical literature on tax
incidence. There is also an extensive body of empirical studies of tax incidence by
public-finance economists. In most cases, the complexities of tax incidence make
empirical analysis exceedingly more difficult than it is likely to be in most anti-
trust passing-on cases. For an extensive survey of tax-incidence theory and
empirical studies, see Break, supra note 33, at 119.
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When the chain itself can be identified, however, tracing an
overcharge is manageable. Subject to one condition, noted below,
estimating the rate of passing on is entirely feasible, and in all
instances, without condition, determining the rate from evidence of
actual pricing practices is feasible. When estimates can appro-
priately be made, the factors that must be taken into account are
few in number and, in any particular industry, the relevant facts
are likely to be obvious or easily discovered. Thus, it is possible
to develop a fairly simple, easily manageable methodology for mak-
ing estimates of passing on which will be sufficiently accurate to
serve as rebuttable presumptions. If courts follow the methodology,
make the estimates, and announce the results as presumptions, the
results will seldom be subject to successful challenge, though any
party wishing to challenge them may do so on the basis of more
detailed empirical evidence of the kind discussed in the next section.
The condition which must be met before estimates are feasible
concerns the possibility of down-chain markets which are themselves
cartelized or monopolized and which, consequently, will reduce the
rate of passing on. In theoretical terms the problem arises when-
ever, to use the Supreme Court's language, "direct purchasers ...
sell in imperfectly competitive markets .... ," 100 In practice, it
arises only when substantial market power is being exercised at two
levels.1 " Structural conditions consistent with substantial down-
chain market power will not occur routinely and can be identified
when they do occur. In these instances, unless the possibility of an
existing down-chain monopoly or cartel can be negated, no estimate
of passing on would be sufficiently reliable to serve as a presumption.
The party attempting to prove passing on would have to do so
directly by means of more complete evidence of actual pricing
practices, in the manner discussed in the next section.
There are five classes of factors which should be considered in
making such an estimate of the rate of passing on: temporal relation-
ships, pricing practices, directness of affected costs, supply, and
demand. In any specific case, one or more of these factors may be
determinative in the sense that the outcome will be certain whatever
the nature of the other factors. For example, if the overcharge
was imposed sufficiently long ago that long-run adjustments have
been made, then a high rate of passing on will have been achieved,
and the significance of other factors pales. Similarly, if supply is
highly elastic, then elasticity of demand is irrelevant. On the whole,
100 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 742 (1977).
101 See part I(C) supra.
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though, the analyst should be guided by an examination of each of
these factors. 02 In this section we identify the factors and indicate
the implications of each; in part V we demonstrate their use.
I. Temporal Factors
a. Frequency of price changes. The more frequently price
changes occur under the pricing conventions used in an industry,
the sooner an overcharge increasing supply costs will be passed on
to customers. The less frequently price changes are made, the
higher the probability that the overcharge will be absorbed for an
interval before it is passed on.
b. Duration of the monopoly overcharge. The longer the
duration of the cartel or monopoly and the overcharge it imposes,
the greater is the likelihood that the cost increase will be passed on
to indirect purchasers. Firms may absorb a portion or, in some
circumstances, even all of an overcharge in the short run (up to
about a year), but in the long run prices must come to reflect costs.
2. Pricing Factors
a. Consistency of pricing practices. The more regular are
individual pricing decisions (that is, the more rigidly a standard
pricing policy is followed), the easier is the determination of the
passing-on rate. At one extreme is a firm which uses the same
percentage markup irrespective of product characteristics and
supply or demand considerations; its passing-on rate is defined as
100% plus that markup rate. At the other extreme is a firm with-
out a pricing policy, which sets prices subjectively or at whim.
b. Basis of pricing policy. The greater the extent to which
price decisions are based upon supply costs, the more certain the
rate of passing on can be determined by numerical operation. The
more that demand factors play an important role in price setting,
the more likely that the rate of passing on in the short run will be
less than 100%.
3. Directness of Cost Factors
a. Directness of cost. The more the overcharge affects direct
cost, the sooner the pass on will occur, and the higher the rate of
102 In stating the probable effect of any one factor, we "hold constant" any
other relevant factors. Thus, our discussion of each factor assumes "other things
being equal."
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passing on will be. At the limit, direct costs will be reflected im-
mediately, as in the case of retailers or wholesalers that price items
as they arrive to reflect the actual cost of that stock of merchandise.
b. Assignment of indirect costs. In a multiproduct firm, when
an overcharge increases an indirect cost spread over a large number
of products sold to different classes of purchasers, the determination
of passing on will be more difficult and rates of passing on will
more likely vary among different products and, hence, among dif-
ferent indirect purchasers.
c. Computation of indirect costs. If an overcharge affects in-
direct costs, then the more sophisticated the pricing system (with
respect to indirect costs) and the more frequently indirect costs
are calculated and apportioned to products, the sooner a pass on
will occur and the higher the rate of passing on will be.10 3 If
there is a highly automated accounting system which closely moni-
tors changes in indirect costs, a pass on will occur in the short run.
At the opposite extreme, if the firm uses a crude cost-plus pricing
system, the increase in indirect cost might not be passed on at all, or
at least not for several years.
4. Supply Factors
a. Firm elasticity of supply. The more elastic the supply
curve of the individual direct purchaser, the higher will be the
rate of passing on. If it appears that the firm could expand output
appreciably without increasing unit costs, then elasticity is high:
irrespective of demand, the rate of passing on will be high. If
direct cost is equal to invoice cost and the firm can buy as much
of the cartelized or monopolized product from suppliers as it can
sell, the firm has a perfectly elastic supply curve. In this case the
rate of passing on will be at least 100%. By contrast, if unit costs
rise as output increases in the short run, the passing-on rate will
be lower.
b. Industry elasticity of supply. The more elastic the supply
curve of the industry (of direct purchasers), the higher will be the
rate of passing on. If industry capacity can be adapted to output
easily and quickly (as in the case of retail stores or service estab-
lishments without specialized or extensive capital equipment), if
103 The majority of firms using cost-plus pricing would recompute indirect
costs at least annually because the requisite data need to be collected and com-
puted for tax purposes anyway.
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there are no significant barriers to entry or exit of firms, and if
there are no serious shortages of critical factors of production, then
market forces are more likely to induce prices to equilibrate with
costs so that firms are forced by market pressures to pass on cost
increases.
c. Industry production technology. The greater the uniformity
of production technique among firms in industry R, the higher will
be the probability that a monopoly overcharge will be passed on
because the costs of each firm will be similarly affected. The lower
the potential for factor substitution for the price-fixed input, the
higher will be the passing-on rate because firms cannot avoid the
cost increase by changing factor-input combinations. Note that for
resellers (for whom the output is physically identical to the price-
fixed input) factor substitutability is zero.
5. Demand Factors
a. Firm elasticity of demand. The less elastic the demand
curve of the individual direct purchaser, the higher will be the
rate of passing on.104 The greater the competition among direct
purchasers in the sale of their products, the more elastic demand
will be. If some of their competitors do not have increased costs,1 5
then direct purchasers may have to absorb a cost increase in order
to remain competitive in their markets. Alternatively, the larger
the market share of firms whose costs are increased, the higher will
be the probability of passing on.
b. Industry elasticity of demand. The less elastic the demand
curve of the industry (of direct purchasers), the higher will be the
rate of passing on. The fewer the readily available substitutes and
the smaller the share of consumers' budgets taken by the product,
the less elastic demand will be. The more constraining production
technology is or the lower the cost of an input relative to total
production cost, the less elastic will be demand of firms.
.
0 4 For a discussion of the determinants of elasticity of demand in a passing-on
context, see Schaefer, supra note 5, at 887-900.
105 This might occur in the following situation: Suppose that M is a regional
industry producing components for R, which has a national market. If M firms in
one regional market conspire to fix prices, some R firms would pay the higher price,
others would not. In that event, the affected R firms may have to absorb the cost
increase in order to maintain a competitive price with the unaffected R firms, at
least in the short run. The losses occasioned by their competitive disadvantage
would, sooner or later, drive these firms from the market.
1979]
320 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The use of these principles to make estimates about passing on
requires sound judgment and a sense for economic relations, but
arcane knowledge and esoteric techniques are not needed. In
most situations the relevant factual information will be neither
obscure nor complex: the analysis is fairly simple and straight-
forward, and the results are often obvious. In order to demonstrate
this method of analysis, we review in the next part sixty-five govern-
ment price-fixing cases. Before doing so, we discuss the empirical
inquiry into passing on more fully.
B. Measuring Passing On Empirically
When managers make pricing decisions, they utilize one of a
limited number of standardized, readily understandable pricing
methods. The practice used by any single firm may develop and
change somewhat over time but at any given time will be highly
standardized and usually based upon industrywide or regional
marketwide customs or conventions. Given these standardized
practices, a fairly simple factual investigation will reveal the data
needed for the evaluation of relationships like those identified in
the preceding section. Indeed, a more detailed, yet manageable,
inquiry will show the time at which, the manner in which, and the
full extent to which a monopoly overcharge on any input factor is
passed down the chain.
There will be occasions, nevertheless, when the process of trac-
ing an overcharge to particular downstream purchasers will be
daunting. If the direct purchaser makes a large number of products
and the overcharge raises an indirect cost, a series of complex sub-
chains may be initiated through which the overcharge cannot be
traced or can be traced only at excessive cost. It is essential, then,
to determine how far the chain of purchasers can be identified: a
pass on can be traced no further down the chain than to those pur-
chasers than can be identified as a class. We address these prob-
lems more fully in part V. Here it is sufficient to note (as we show
in part VI) that most of these kinds of problems can be handled
in conventional and sensible ways through the application of exist-
ing concepts.
We turn, then, to the cases which concern us: those in which
the chain of distribution can be followed beyond the level of the
direct purchaser. Often, it will appear quickly, clearly, and incon-
testably that the full amount of the overcharge was immediately
passed on. When markup pricing is used, a full pass on of all
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overcharges on items classified by the direct purchaser as direct
costs will take place as soon as the direct purchaser marks up the
invoice price. Almost all retailers, wholesalers, and contractors
price this way and mark up immediately. Such information could
be obtained from any informed witness in a short deposition and
could be easily verified with documents. In these cases-and they
are numerous-dispute would be unlikely.
Further, there will not be much additional difficulty when
markup pricing is used and the overcharge is on an item classified
as an indirect cost. Evidence would then have to be obtained about
when, following the imposition of the overcharge, markup rates were
first reviewed and adjusted, and about how increases in indirect costs
were dealt with. Thus would hardly be an unmanageable task.
Again, overcharges affecting direct costs are easily handled when
cost-plus pricing is encountered: the inquiry would be much like
that just envisaged. When such a pricing method is used, direct
costs are recalculated periodically and prices then adjusted to reflect
cost changes. The matter to be determined is simply how soon after
imposition of the overcharge the next such adjustment took place.
With this pricing method, indirect costs are also dealt with by
standard techniques. If the overcharge imposed affects an indirect
cost, the question to be answered is how frequently, and in what
manner, either markup rates or costs are adjusted to reflect changes
in these costs and when, following imposition of the overcharge,
this was first done. None of these issues is particularly murky:
these are run-of-the-mill litigation problems. The actual pricing
practice used will leave its own clear, objective traces in the records
of affected firms. Oral testimony from management about the
processes used can thus be readily verified or impeached.
The last complexity is the possibility of subjective adjustments
to reflect demand factors. In the great majority of cases this will
not have occurred. When it does occur, moreover, that fact and
its effect upon the passing-on rate can be easily determined from
the evidence. Here, too, objective documentation will be available.
V. ANALYSIS OF PASSING ON IN RECENT PRIcE-FIXING CASES
In the preceding sections, we used economic theory and institu-
tional knowledge about commercial pricing methods to show that
when a seller at a high level on a production-distribution chain
imposes a monopoly overcharge, direct purchasers will, as a rule,
pass it on to indirect purchasers. We have presented general eco-
nomic principles which might guide the examination of passing on
1979]
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in specific cases, thus facilitating presumptive judgments about
passing on even without empirical review. Finally, we have also
shown that through empirical investigations of specific pricing situa-
tions the accurate determination of passing-on rates in actual
markets will often be well within the capacity of courts.
We now put these claims to the test. In this section we present
economic facts from sixty-five recent price-fixing cases brought and
won by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department to illus-
trate the processes used in the investigation of passing on. Although
it is not feasible for us to complete a comprehensive empirical in-
vestigation of any of these cases, we complete (or, in some instances,
nearly complete) an estimate of the extent of passing on using the
factors described in part IV(A). We demonstrate that the analysis
of passing on involves a sequence of quite manageable inquiries,
each of which has the potential for providing a dispositive answer
to the ultimate question-what ought a court do in each instance
about passing on? Last, by drawing inferences from the aggregate
results of inquiry into these cases, we find further support for the
conclusion that in many cases indirect purchasers bear all or most
of the costs of a monopoly overcharge.
The cases for which data are presented in the Table in the
Appendix were brought by the Antitrust Division under section 1
of the Sherman Act.106 All were criminal cases either won at trial
or settled by a plea of nolo contendere between January, 1963, and
December, 1972.107 Data about these cases were derived from the
indictments or complaints and related court records, the press re-
leases accompanying case filings, and factual memoranda and sup-
porting documents prepared by the Antitrust Division staff which
investigated the violations. In cases for which data are omitted from
the Table, the relevant facts were not available.
The cases are listed in the first column of the Table by the
same numbers that are used in the CCH Trade Regulation Report
("Blue Book"). 08 The second column sets forth the name of the
product for which the price was fixed, designated in accordance with
the Census Bureau's Standard Industrial Classification system. The
information in the next four columns (the territorial scope of the
conspiracy, the number of conspirators, the total number of firms
106 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
107 This list of cases was first presented in Hay & Kelley, An Empirical Survey
of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & ECON. 13, 17-28 (1974).
108 Summaries of these cases can be found in [1961-1970 Transfer Binder, U.S.
Antitrust Cases] TnADnE EG. Ri. (CCH) 1145,063-45,070 and 4 TADE BEG.
REP. (CCH) 11145,070-45,072.
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in the market, and the percentage of total market sales made by the
conspirators) is taken directly from Hay and Kelley. 1 9 These data,
which describe the relevant market and size distribution of firms in
the industry,"1 0 would be relevant to either an empirical or theoreti-
cal analysis of passing on.
Taking that data as given in the Table, the passing-on analysis
can begin. Whether one is proceeding empirically or theoretically,
a sequence of questions must be asked. The first four questions,
discussed in section A, apply to either type of inquiry. Who are the
direct purchasers? Are the direct purchasers also final purchasers?
Can the final purchasers on the distribution chain be identified as a
class? Can they be identified as individuals? Based upon the
answers to these questions, a judgment is made whether it is pos-
sible or practical to trace any passing on. If not, the inquiry stops.
If it does appear practicable, the inquiry proceeds.
A. Inquiries from Which It Can Be Determined Whether
It Is Possible to Trace an Overcharge
The first question-who are the direct purchasers?-is always
easy to answer. In our Table, the seventh column lists the class or
classes of purchasers that bought the price-fixed product directly
from the conspirators."' The conspirators, of course, would stand
in the place of the M firms (the manufacturers): these are the anti-
trust-law violators that impose a monopoly overcharge. In'order
for passing on to be a relevant issue, there must be a distribution
chain below M-at least two sequential purchasers, one (or more)
to stand in the position of the R firm (the reseller), and one (or
more, if the chain has split into two or more branches) to stand in
the position of C households or firms, the final purchasers (or
consumers). If there is only one sale from M to C (as was the
case, for example, in case no. 1930 in the Table, in which class
rings were sold by the conspirators directly to student consumers),
there can be no passing-on problem. In that kind of case each
direct buyer pays the full overcharge and has no alternative to
absorbing it.112
10 9 Hay & Kelley, supra note 107, at 29-38.
-10 "In most cases the data are taken from the last year in which the conspiracy
was fully operative." Id. 19.
111 Hay and Kelley left this column empty "Ei]f the buyers were a very
heterogeneous group, or if their identity was simply not known." Id. 20. We have
filled in those spaces [1744, 1748, 1751, 1818, 2036] with the general term
"industrial users" or with information from the case summaries. See note 108 supra.
112A prospective purchaser can avoid the overcharge by not purchasing the
price-fixed product. This accounts for the allocative effect described in part I, see
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In the eighth column, we come to the second inquiry in the
analysis-is the direct purchaser the final purchaser? When there
are two or more classes of direct purchasers indicated in the seventh
column, there may be two answers to this inquiry: one class of
direct purchasers may be final purchasers and another not. In
many instances, whether purchasers in a particular class (students
buying rings, contractors buying linoleum) are direct purchasers will
be a conceptually simple question easily answered from the avail-
able empirical data. In deciding whether purchasers in a particular
class are final purchasers, however, we must sometimes make a
judgment having policy significance. We have used a standard
which is simple to apply and responsive to the functional purpose:
no purchaser that uses the product as an input for a product or
service sold at a market-determined price is treated as a final pur-
chaser of that product, regardless of whether the product is trans-
formed or incorporated into, for example, a larger assembly before
being resold. Any such purchaser has the potential capacity to
pass the overcharge on. Hence, the inquiry should be pursued if
feasible. We have classified as final only those purchasers that
either consume the product (such as a household purchaser of
bakery products) or that pass on the product but not at a market-
determined price. The latter category would include non-pricing
institutions such as government agencies or public schools.
When direct purchasers are the consumers of a product, they
are easily identified. Examples in the Table include liquefied
petroleum gas sold to households [1756]; 113 refuse-collection service
sold to households [1763], fuel oil sold to households [1928], auto
repairs sold to car owners [2156], and overhead garage doors sold
to households [2211]. When direct purchasers are non-pricing in-
stitutions, they can also be identified readily enough without par-
ticularly difficult problems of evidence or judgment. Consider case
no. 1749, for example: strictly speaking, metal library shelves are
passed on to the users of library services. They are an input into
the production of library services, but because the direct purchasers
-schools, colleges, and government agencies-do not charge cus-
tomers of library services market-determined prices which reflect
the costs of providing those services, there is little question that a
cost increase is not passed on. Hence, we classify these non-pricing
notes 45-46 & accompanying text-that is, the loss of economic welfare attributable
to the reduction in sales of the price-fixed product.
113 Throughout this section, numbers within brackets, e.g., [1847], refer to the
Blue Book number of the case as listed in the Table.
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institutions and agencies as final purchasers even though they may
not literally be the consumers of the product in question.llaa The
institutions we have so classified include schools and colleges; local,
state, and national governmental units; hospitals; 114 and the mili-
tary. Note, however, that when one of these institutions resells
the product at a cost-based price, we do not classify it as the final
purchaser. For example, the military installations which were the
first purchasers of nonpremium beer [1847] resold that product at a
cost-based price in military exchanges and recreational facilities.
We therefore treat the consumers of the beer as the final purchasers.
Of course, we do not have complete data on all of these cases, and
it may be that there are some products or services that we have
concluded were not passed on at a market-based price which, in
fact, were resold on such a basis. Our point here is merely that
these issues are neither arcane nor particularly complex: with man-
ageable amounts of data, these classifications can be made with a
high degree of confidence.
At this juncture, three points should be emphasized. The first
is the ease of determining whether the first purchaser is the final
purchaser. All that need be asked is whether the direct purchaser
resells the product (whether in the same form or transformed by a
production process) to someone else. If so, the direct purchaser is
not the final purchaser and the issue of passing on must be pur-
sued. The second is the relatively small share of cases (12.3%) in
which all direct purchasers are final purchasers. The effect of the
Illinois Brick 15 ruling, accordingly, would be to deny a remedy to
final purchasers in the vast majority of cases (87.7%) without ever
raising the issue of passing on. The third is that when the direct
3a Supporters of the Illinois Brick rule argue that to maximize deterrence, the
cause of action for an overcharge must be assigned to that level of the distribution
chain at which the number of purchasers is smallest, the organization costs are
lowest, the level of sophistication is greatest, and the financial incentive of each
purchaser to sue is largest. They routinely assume that these indicia identify direct
purchasers. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 61a, at 608-15. In cases like
many of those in our sample, in which the final purchasers are government agencies
or other nonpricing institutions, the weight of that deterrent argument supports
granting the cause of action to indirect purchasers. Illinois Brick itself is instructive:
the Attorney General brought that action on behalf of 700 local government entities-
all final purchasers of the price-fixed product
114 Hospitals represent a difficult choice in designating final purchasers. Many
hospitals are nonprofit organizations whose prices do not cover the costs of service
(indeed, they often lack the requisite cost data for even computing such prices).
On the other hand, hospitals are increasingly employing modem management and
pricing techniques (partly in response to insurers who will pay for only "the cost
of service"). In those cases, the users of hospital services are more likely to be the
final purchasers.
115 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra.
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purchasers are found to be the final purchasers, no further inquiry
is needed: there is no passing on.
Thus, in eight of the sixty-five cases we reviewed, inquiry
terminates at this stage. In four of these eight cases, the direct
purchasers are consumers: these involve class rings [1930], gasoline
[1951], auto repair [1994], and retail shoes [2192]. In the four other
cases, the direct purchasers are public institutions: these concern
metal library shelves [1749], liquid asphalt [1860], school construc-
tion [1909], and athletic equipment [2009]. These buyers suffered
the economic loss resulting from the overcharges and thus ought to
have a private action for redress." 6
In sixteen of the sixty-five cases, some of the direct purchasers
are final purchasers; others are not.1" 7 Seven of these cases involve
the sale of food products both to final consumers (such as schools
and hospitals) and to retail stores and/or restaurants which resell
the products at a market-determined price. The application of
Illinois Brick in these cases, by limiting availability of the private
remedy to direct purchasers, would grant all direct purchasers a pro
rata share of the recovered overcharge, even though some may have
passed the overcharge on while others could not.
Perhaps the most anomalous result under present law is illus-
trated by the case involving overhead garage-door openers [2211].
The only ultimate consumers are households: such consumers may
buy the product either directly from a manufacturer for self-installa-
tion or indirectly from a service firm which also installs the product.
Based on the economic characteristics of the case, there is every
reason to believe that consumers bear the cost of the price conspiracy
regardless of whether they buy directly or indirectly from the con-
spirators. Yet, Illinois Brick mandates that these two groups of
consumers be treated differently: there is full recourse for one
group, none for the other.
In twenty-four of the sixty-five cases, then, some or all of the
direct purchasers are final purchasers, so the issue of passing on
need not be raised for those purchasers. Further analysis need be
pressed only with respect to those direct purchasers that are not final
purchasers. In the sixteen mixed cases, the further analysis applies
only to that group of direct purchasers that uses the product as an
input for a commercial activity. For example, in the garage-door-
116 These cases come out correctly under the Illinois Brick rule; they would also
come out correctly if that rule were overridden. Upon analysis, they involve no
passing-on problem.
"1
7 See case nos. 1743, 1754, 1756, 1763, 1802, 1880, 1928, 1963, 1970, 1997,
2034, 2156, 2189, 2211, 2246, & 2278.
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openers case, further analysis is needed only to determine whether
contractors passed on the cost increase to the indirect purchasers,
households.
Having determined that there is a possibility of passing on in
fifty-seven of the sixty-five cases (those in which some or all of the
direct purchasers are not final purchasers), we want to estimate the
probability of passing on in those cases. We are interested in both
the process and the results: we want to illustrate the method of
determining passing on, and we want to know the frequency with
which a high rate of passing on occurs.
The third inquiry in the analytical process is, then, to identify
the class of final purchasers of the product involved in each case.
Based on the material available to us, we have, in the ninth column
of the Table, classified as high, low, or medium the ease of identify-
ing the class of final purchasers. (In the same column we classify
in the same way the relative ease of identifying individual pur-
chasers once the class has been identified; this responds to the fourth
inquiry, yet to be discussed.) If we cannot readily identify final
purchasers even as a class, then further analysis of passing on be-
comes a very difficult, perhaps intractable, problem. The third
inquiry, then, is another possible stopping point. When it appears
that the first (or any subsequent) purchaser uses the product as an
input for other products which are passed on at a price, but that
the production-distribution chain is so multilineal, fractured, or
convoluted as to make tracing through to the next step unfeasible,
the inquiry, quite simply, must end.118
In nine of fifty-seven cases, we have classified the "ease of iden-
tifying final purchasers as a class" as "low." That does not neces-
sarily mean that a court could not identify final purchasers as a
class, because parties to a litigation might be able to provide the
court with more extensive information than we possess about these
industries. Even so, there will no doubt be a minority of cases in
which it will not be possible to make a reasonable identification of
the final purchasers, usually because the cost increase is passed on
through a large number of different products to different kinds
of users.
118 Contrast this standard with the much narrower one, based entirely on
pricing policy, which is implicitly suggested by In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig.,
600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979). Because it is our view that the appropriate stopping
point should take account of the distribution structure, not solely the pricing method
used, we do not think that even an open-ended construction of the passing-on
exception, like that suggested by the Beef Industry litigation, adequately responds to
the problems presented by Illinois Brick.
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The identification of final purchasers as a class is most difficult
in cases involving industrial products which are sold to manufac-
turers that use them as inputs into their respective production
processes. Examples of this sort are the cases involving rolled-steel
pipe flanges and rings [1744], steel castings [1751], carbon-steel sheets
[1796], and drill-jig bushings [1890]. Identification of final pur-
chasers as a class is also difficult when the direct purchasers are
small-business establishments providing many different types of
goods and services to consumers, such as linen supplies [2032],
liquefied-petroleum-gas delivery [1756], and refuse collection [1763].
Such cases are the stuff out of which horrendous hypotheticals are
constructed by opponents of any change in the Illinois Brick rule.119
Such cases do exist, but the sound response is not to say that, because
hard cases exist, we ought never to examine passing on. Rather,
when these cases are encountered-and they can be identified readily
enough-one should terminate the inquiry.
In the nine cases in which we were unable to identify final
purchasers as a class, we have not attempted to estimate the rate of
passing on. Rather, we have in the last column stated that the
"probability of a high rate of passing on" is "indeterminate."
Again, that means neither that a court with more data could not
identify the class and then determine the passing-on rate nor that
direct purchasers ought to be given standing automatically because
final purchasers cannot be identified. It may be feasible to identify
one or more levels of passing on or to identify some, but not all,
final purchasers. Suppose, for example, that further information
showed that the major purchasers of carbon-steel sheets [1796] were
household-appliance manufacturers. This would suggest that house-
holds purchasing those appliances constitute one important class of
final purchasers. Carbon-steel sheets might be used for many other
purposes as well, no one of which represents a significant share of
total sales. If so, two purchaser classes might be designated, the first
consisting of direct purchasers of carbon-steel sheets (except appli-
ance manufacturers), and the second of purchasers of household ap-
pliances. The point is that inquiry is usually manageable and any
difficulties can often be resolved, at least in part.
In six cases it was possible to identify a class of final purchasers
of a significant share, but not all, of the output of the conspirators.
In these cases we have designated "ease of identifying final pur-
chasers as a class" as "medium." It still makes sense to continue
"19 See, e.g., 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, pt. 2, at 313-14 (statement
of Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.).
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the passing-on analysis to determine whether it is likely that a large
share of the price increase was passed on to the final purchasers so
identified. In the case of industrial linen supplies sold to gasoline
stations and automobile dealers [2025], for example, it is apparent
that consumers of gasoline and automobiles would be the largest
groups of final purchasers, though there may be other groups not
easily identified. Admittedly, there is some ambiguity in these
fifteen cases in which we have characterized the ease of identification
of a class of final purchasers as either "medium" or "low," but these
represent only 26.3% of the fifty-seven cases in which it is possible
to estimate passing on.
Consider some illustrations of the identification of final pur-
chasers as a class. In twenty-two of the forty-seven cases in which
it was easy to identify the final-purchaser class, the product involved
is a consumer product sold through retail outlets or service estab-
lishments. Examples include bed springs [1748], women's swim-
suits [1778], milk [1880], bread [1963, 1997, 2182], and meat [2278].
Another fifteen cases in which class identification was easy involve
contractors as the direct purchasers. Examples include lineoleum
installation [1773], fabricated structural steel [1779], concrete pipe
[1885, 1888], and ready-mix concrete [2035, 2124, 2136]. Compli-
cated economic analysis is not required to discern that in both of
these types of cases-retail goods and contracting services-the ulti-
mate consumers of the goods or services are the final purchasers.
There may or may not be actual passing on of price increases by
direct purchasers to these final purchasers, but there can be no doubt
regarding the feasibility of passing on.
In instances in which final purchasers have been identified as a
class, we must turn to the fourth inquiry in the sequence: how dif-
ficult would it be to identify class members as individuals? Once
final purchasers have been identified as a class, capacity to identify
them individually is not necessarily a prerequisite to compensation
in a legal regime which authorizes an overcharge suit on their be-
half. As we shall show more fully in part VI, either a parens
patriae or class action might be authorized and a cy pres remedy
designed which would benefit class members more or less com-
mensurately with the injuries they individually suffered. Thus,
even when it would be very difficult to identify specific individuals,
as often will be the case, the passing-on inquiry need not stop.
While not a prerequisite for private action, the relative ease of
identifying individual final purchasers is important. The more
difficult their identification, the less likely it is that individual pur-
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chasers will bring private actions against antitrust-law violators.
Even if suit were successfully brought on their behalf, the inability
to identify individual final purchasers would necessitate a cy pres
distribution of the judgment.
Of the forty-eight cases in which it was easy to identify all or a
significant portion of the final purchasers by class, in twelve it was
also relatively easy to identify individual final purchasers. Eleven
of these cases involve contractors as the direct purchasers, 120 and the
other involves apartment owners [1928]. In all of these instances
(21% of the cases in which passing on may have occurred), the in-
direct purchasers that may actually have suffered the loss-govern-
ment agencies, corporations, and individuals who hired contractors,
and apartment residents and owners-were in a position to protect
their own interests. As a general proposition, the identification of
individual final purchasers will be relatively easy when there are
relatively few, large transactions between direct and final purchasers
(as with construction projects and contracting services), or a long-
term business relationship between the direct and final purchasers
(as in the case of apartment owners). In any randomly selected
group of overcharge cases, there will likely be-as in our sample-
a significant number of this type.
In most cases we examined, though, identification of individual
final purchasers was difficult because the number of transactions and
purchasers was large, and the size of the particular transaction was
small. Usually, when "ease of identifying final purchasers as in-
dividuals" is rated "low" (twenty-nine cases) or "medium" (seven
cases), the direct purchasers are retail stores or service establishments
that sell to a large number of customers without establishing long-
term business relationships with many of them. Examples include
cases involving resale book matches [1883], dairy products [1925,
2034, 2189], and bread [1963, 1997, 2182]. The identification of
individual final purchasers is not a prerequisite for private action,
though. It is important to reiterate that in forty-two of the fifty-
seven cases in which the direct purchasers are not the final pur-
chasers, the identification of final purchasers as a class was relatively
easy, and in six other cases, it was possible to identify at least a
significant number of final purchasers as a class. In the thirty-six
of the forty-eight cases in which final-purchaser classes could be
readily identified, redress for any overcharge passed on would have
to be on a cy pres basis.
120 See case nos. 1773, 1779, 1842, 1885, 1887, 1888, 1957, 2035, 2124, 2136,
& 2211.
[VoI. 128:269
PASSING ON THE MONOPOLY OVERCHARGE
It is these forty-eight cases, then-twelve in which final pur-
chasers can be identified as a class and as individuals and thirty-six
in which they can be identified only as a class-that further analysis
of passing on remains relevant. As shown in part IV(B), a complete
empirical analysis would often involve nothing more onerous than
gathering information about highly standardized and readily under-
standable pricing policies and how they were applied in particular
situations. However, we lack the data to demonstrate that for our
sample cases. We turn, then, to the additional inquiries which
would be involved in completing the analysis by drawing on the
general principles outlined in part IV(A).
B. Inquiries from Which the Rate of Passing On Can Be Estimated
When the Final Purchasers Have Been Determined as a Class
The purpose of this analysis is not to estimate precisely the
rate of passing on. Such an analysis would require more business
facts for the cases than we possess. Rather, we seek to determine
with a reasonable degree of certainty whether there was in each
case a high probability of a very high rate of passing on. To make
such an analysis in any actual case, one would inquire about the
five factors enumerated in part III; the length of the conspiracy,
pricing methods, the directness of costs affected by a monopoly
overcharge, the elasticity of supply, and the elasticity of demand.
For the cases in our study, however, we have no actual daia regard-
ing the first two sets of factors: we know neither the actual duration
of the price-fixing conspiracy in each case nor the frequency of
price changes in the respective industries (though, in inflationary
periods one can reasonably expect frequent price changes in virtually
all industries). Nor do we have any specific information regarding
actual pricing practices in each case.
In a litigation context, of course, all such information would be
available to the court. Proof of the price-fixing conspiracy would
be part of the plaintiff's case: evidence showing when as well as how
it was accomplished would be essential. If the Court deemed it
appropriate to rule on passing-on questions in a pretrial motion
proceeding, the parties could cite, and the court could use, the
product of the discovery process for facts about when the con-
spiracy developed (or, in appropriate cases, could accept for pur-
poses of the particular motion allegations about the time the con-
spiracy began). Evidence about the pricing method used by alleged
conspirators would be even more readily available and, thus, easy to
obtain and present to the court.
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To deal with our lack of specific information about duration
and pricing methods, we make reasonable, but conservative, assump-
tions about both the duration of the offense and the pricing prac-
tices employed by the direct purchasers. We assume that the viola-
tion continued for at least one year before the case was brought: it
seems highly unlikely that the government would have learned of
the alleged violation, investigated it, and started proceedings in
less time. Because the longer the cartel is operative the greater
the rate of passing on, our assumption is conservative in that it tends
to understate the likely extent of passing on. As for pricing method,
we assume that firms used the one common in their trade (for ex-
ample, markup pricing by retailers or cost-plus pricing by contrac-
tors). The institutional literature cited in part II 121 indicates that
this assumption is correct in the overwhelming majority of instances.
Given these assumptions, our estimate of the probability of a high
rate of passing on depends upon the remaining three factors:
whether the product for which the price has been increased by the
conspiracy at M is a direct cost to the R-level firms which use the
product as an input in their operations; the elasticity of supply; and
the elasticity of demand.
22
This leads us, then, to the third specific inquiry in the
passing-on analysis: how direct is the cost of the cartelized product
when viewed as an input to the productive or commercial processes
of firms at the level of distribution one step below the conspirators?
As we showed in part IV(A), the more direct the cost which is in-
creased by the overcharge, the higher is the probability of a high
rate of passing on. In thirty-three of the forty-eight cases, the costs
affected by the fixed prices were very direct. In the tenth column
of the Table, we have classified these as "high." In six cases, costs
were moderately direct (designated "medium" on the Table), and
in nine cases, the cost was relatively indirect (designated "low" on
the Table).
The empirical concept of directness of costs is roughly equiva-
lent to the theoretical concept of variability of costs. When direct
121 See sources cited in notes 68, 73, 75, 77 & 78 supra.
122 The estimates we completed are conservative in two senses. First, we have
very limited information relative to the amount of data readily available to or easily
obtainable by a court in an actual case. If we were able to make confident estimates
about the rate of passing on with such limited information, then a court should be
able to do so with even greater confidence. Second, we have been conservative in
our estimates of the probability of high passing on rates: if there is any reasonable
doubt, we have posited the conservative (that is, lower) estimate. As a consequence,
the estimates presented in the Table may actually understate the frequency of high
passing on rates.
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costs are increased by an overcharge, it is likely that all or a signifi-
cant part of the increase will be passed on. Nevertheless, we cannot
conclude on the basis of high directness alone that there is a great
likelihood of a high rate of passing on. Rather, these cases become
prime targets for further inquiry. The remaining question, pursued
below, is whether, despite high directness, unusual elasticities pre-
vail which tend to reduce this rate of passing on.
Examples of the thirty-three cases clearly displaying high direct-
ness are linoleum installation [1733], in which the work is done by
subcontractors for contractors (who treat the subcontractors' work
as a direct cost of performing their general contracts), gasoline
[1849] sold to retailers who resell it to the motorists, and steel
products [1818] sold to businesses that utilize them in further in-
dustrial operations. Most of the high-directness cases involve either
sales to firms that resell, though perhaps with some further process-
ing,12 3 or sales to contractors.u 4 A few [for instance, 1800, 1928]
involve sales to firms that do extensive additional processing.
In the nine cases in which the overcharge imposed by the price-
fixing cartel is on items regarded by the R-level firms as indirect
costs, we could not, on that basis alone, confidently draw any infer-
ence about the likelihood of either a high or low passing-on rate.
If the data were available, we would turn at this point on an evalua-
tion of the relationship between the length of time the cartel had
existed and the frequency with which, under the prevailing pricing
method, it made a price response to changes in direct costs. The
longer a conspiracy is operative, the higher the probability of a high
passing-on rate; the more frequently indirect costs are computed
and markup or cost-plus percentages modified, the sooner the cost
increase will be passed on. Lacking data on these matters, we as-
sumed a year-long price conspiracy and the use of typical industry
pricing systems. Using these conservative assumptions, we estimated
that the likelihood of a high rate of passing on was low in all nine
cases involving low directness. Thus, in all of these cases, our in-
quiry ends at this point: there is no need to consider elasticities.
Note that more information would likely suggest a different
result in some of these cases. Despite low directness, overcharges
would be passed on to the final purchasers in any case in which the
conspiracy lasted long enough for direct purchasers to make long-
123 See case nos. 1778, 1847, 1849, 1880, 1883, 1925, 1963, 1970, 1997, 2104,
2182, 2189, 2277, & 2278.
124 See case nos. 1773, 1779, 1842, 1885, 1887, 1888, 1921, 1957, 1965, 2034,
2035, 2124, 2136, 2211, & 2243.
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run adjustments. In some cases-for example, sales of welding
electrodes to transportation- and chemical-industry firms [1802-
many purchasers would likely have sophisticated information sys-
tems which would speed such adjustments. Thus, in any instance
in which the conspiracy lasted significantly longer than a year, the
rate of passing on would increase rapidly despite low directness.
Indeed, some pricing systems would probably reflect some of the
costs we labeled indirect even in the short run.
We tried to be similarly conservative in spanning the informa-
tion gap in the six cases in which affected costs were moderately
direct. In these we made cautious "judgment calls" by labeling
the probability of a high rate of passing on as "medium" in five
cases and "low" in the sixth. Bed springs sold to mattress manu-
facturers [1748] is an example. In an industry that typically uses
cost-plus pricing moderated at times by demand factors reflected
through inventory, increases in a material cost like this one would
often be responded to in the short run, but on occasion the response
would be delayed. Having no more pricing information, and as-
suming the conspiracy to be in effect for no longer than a year,
we judged the likelihood of a high rate of passing on to be medium.
We made that judgment, however, subject to one condition: if in
any of these situations we found supply to be highly inelastic (an
unlikely but possible circumstance), we would reduce our estimate
of short-run passing on from medium to low.
In the thirty-nine cases in which costs were of either high or
medium directness then, we proceeded with our analysis. We thus
ask whether supply is elastic or inelastic, and whether the direct
purchasers face an elastic demand curve.
When highly direct costs are affected by a price-fixing con-
spiracy, the likelihood that most of the overcharge will be passed on
is great unless one of two unusual conditions prevails: either supply
or demand is highly inelastic. Only in such unusual situations
might the direct purchaser absorb some part of the overcharge in the
short run.
We determined supply elasticities on the basis of the general
characteristics of the industry. Although the presumption is that a
cartelized industry is marked by excess capacity which will increase
supply elasticity, we did not rely on the presumption. Rather,
taking into account such factors as ease of entry, likely start-up time,
and the ease and speed with which capacity could be increased, we
estimated whether supply could be increased without increasing
costs.
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In twenty-seven of the thirty-two cases involving highly direct
costs, the supply curve of the direct purchasers (both as individual
firms and as an industry) were very elastic: expansion of output
would not raise unit costs. When, as in these cases, direct costs are
increased by price-fixing and supply is highly elastic, the almost
certain consequence is a very high rate of passing on even in the
short run. (The only possible counter-indicator would be very
inelastic demand.) Thus, in twenty-seven of the cases the prob-
ability of a high rate of passing on in the short run is clearly high.
Case no. 1773, linoleum installation for contractors, will serve
as an example. The M firms here, the conspirators, are subcon-
tractors who made bids to general contractors, the R firms in our
model, for linoleum work. General contractors universally treat
the costs incurred on such contracts as direct costs and thus reflect
them in full in their own bids-that is, in setting their own prices.
There can be no serious question that overcharges in cases like this
are passed on immediately and in fall in the overwhelming majority
of instances.
In only five of the thirty-three cases in which affected costs
were highly direct did analysis of supply elasticity suggest that the
probability of high short-run passing on was either medium or low.
In the case of commercial baking flour [1800], for example, supply
would be moderately inelastic in the short run, as plant expansion
requires at least a year or so (though, even here, inelasticity of de-
mand suggests short-run passing on). Similar factors suggested
medium supply elasticity, and hence, only a medium likelihood of
a high short-run passing-on rate, for steel products [1818], fuel oil
[1928], brass plumbing [1965], and wholesale meat [2278].
In virtually all of the twenty-eight cases in which high direct-
ness of costs and high elasticity of supply strongly indicate a high
passing-on rate even in the short run, the analysis of passing on is
simple and requires very little empirical evidence. One class of
these cases involves consumer goods in which the direct purchasers
are retail stores: women's swimsuits [1778], nonpremium beer
[1847], gasoline [1849], milk [1880], book matches [1883], dairy
products [1925, 2034, 2189], bread [1963, 1997, 2187], bakery
products [1970, 2277], and snack foods [2104]. The other class of
these cases includes those in which the price-fixed goods or subcon-
tracting services are purchased directly by contractors, which in all
probability pass on the higher costs as part of their prices: linoleum
installation [1773], fabricated structural steel [1885, 1887], cement
installations [1887], plumbing fixtures [1921], plumbing contract-
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ing [1957] maple floors [2034], ready-mix concrete [2035, 2124,
2136], overhead garage doors [2211], and plumbing supplies and
services [2243].
Our final inquiry concerns demand elasticity. It will be re-
called from part IV that this factor would indicate a low, short-run
rate of passing on only if the elasticity of demand were found to be
very high. In none of the thirty-eight cases with high or medium
directness and high supply elasticity did this unusual demand con-
dition prevail. As shown in the twelfth column of the Table,
demand elasticity appears low in the overwhelming majority of
cases, though in a few (such as women's swimsuits [1778]) it is
medium. Hence, in none of these cases did demand factors suggest
that we moderate our tentative conclusion, reached on the basis of
other factors, about the likelihood of passing on.
We present no detailed, empirical proof of a high rate of pass-
ing on in these cases; that is not the purpose of this exercise.
Rather, we argue that by application of economic theory, knowledge
of commercial pricing practices, and a very modest amount of in-
formation, one can be reasonably certain of a high degree of passing
on even in the short run. Thus, a presumption of passing on is
plainly warranted in these cases. A party seeking to challenge the
presumption ought to bear the burden of presenting explicit, em-
pirical evidence to refute the presumption. Certainly, given the
resources and intelligence available to the court, such a determina-
tion, at least in these cases, would require very modest judicial
effort.
Note also that in the twenty-eight cases in which a very high
rate of passing on was highly likely even in the short run, a party
could quite easily obtain and present empirical evidence to refute
the presumption if, in fact, passing on did not occur. Consider,
for example, the pricing response of general contractors to an over-
charge imposed by subcontractors [for example, 1773]. Any in-
stance in which a general contractor absorbed the overcharge por-
tion of the subcontractor's bid would immediately appear from the
general contractor's working papers used to compute the bid.
In cases in which the analysis leads to an inference that the
likelihood of a high rate of passing on in the short run is low, the
presumption ought to be that the direct purchaser has borne the
costs of the overcharge. This presumption would govern unless
evidence were introduced to show that the overcharge was imposed
over a period sufficiently long that the direct purchasers (the R
firms) had already made long-run adjustments and thus passed on,
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or unless other explicit empirical evidence were introduced which
warranted a finding that passing on occurred despite the theoretical
basis for assuming that in the short run it would not occur.
The theoretical analysis nonetheless will not provide such a
clear picture in some cases-that is, the probability of a high rate
of passing on in the short run will appear to be medium, as it did
in ten of our cases. In these instances no presumption about pass-
ing on in the short run is warranted: the burden of proof remains
wherever it was placed at the outset. Any party seeking to prove
or disprove short-run passing on must undertake a more particu-
larized evidentiary inquiry.
In part IV(B), we suggested that a complete evidentiary and
empirical analysis of passing on would not be unduly difficult, and
we emphasized that such an analysis would involve no concepts
which were unusual or would present any difficulty to a court.
Courts (or litigating parties) might for these reasons prefer to do
such a straightforward analysis of actual pricing practice and its
consequences in all cases in which final purchasers can be de-
termined instead of using the approach set forth in this section.
We emphasize, nonetheless, that the method of estimating
which we have proposed is deeply rooted in empirical and institu-
tional realities. The presumption with which it ends is validated
not merely by theory but also by experience. The value of estimat-
ing in this way lies in its potential for reducing the time required to
determine passing-on issues. The methodology does require the
court in some cases to take evidence and make judgments on supply
and demand elasticities-unfamiliar concepts for most courts-but
it does not require that precise information about these elasticities
be known or even knowable. Elasticities become relevant only in
those instances in which there is already a very strong basis for in-
ferring a very high rate of passing on. The purpose of the inquiry
into elasticities is only to determine whether either of two very
unusual conditions prevail-conditions which would be rather
easily recognizable.
Let us, then, summarize the results of the demonstration in this
section. We have reviewed all of the covert price-fixing cases won
by the government in the period from 1960 to 1972. In fifty-seven
of those sixty-five cases, all or a large share of the purchases were
made by firms or individuals who were not the final purchasers, so
that passing on was a possibility in nearly ninety per cent of the
cases. In nine of the fifty-seven cases, however, we were unable to
specify, on the basis of very limited information, the final purchasers
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as a class, so that we made no attempt to estimate the degree of
passing on. Of the remaining forty-eight cases, we estimated, on
the basis of directness of costs and elasticity of supply and demand
in each case, that the probability of a high rate of passing on in the
short run (one year or less, depending on the frequency with which
changes in direct costs are reflected in pricing) was high in twenty-
eight cases, medium in ten cases, and low in ten other cases. In the
long run (more than one year, depending on the time needed in
the particular industry to make adjustments on account of changes
in indirect costs), as we argued in part II, we would expect the rate
of passing on to be high in virtually all cases.
VI. PASSING ON: THE REQUISITES OF A BALANCED POLICY
The prior parts of this Article lead ultimately to the crucial
policy issue: is Illinois Brick sound law or should Congress act to
annul that case and establish a more balanced procedure for dealing
with passing on? In the sections which follow, we evaluate the im-
plications of our analysis for the issues which are most salient in the
Illinois Brick opinion.
A. Judicial Capacity: The Implication of Analysis and Experience
Three relevant propositions may be derived from the prior
parts of this Article: first, when final purchasers can be identified,
either by class or individually, it is well within the range of normal
judicial inquiry to determine the extent to which an upstream over-
charge has been passed on to that class or those individual pur-
chasers; second, at the point in the chain at which it ceases to be
possible to identify purchasers even by class, inquiry about passing
on should be aborted; and third, it is relatively easy to determine
when purchasers can be identified and when they cannot. Given
these propositions, doubt that courts can handle passing-on evidence
-the concern that Justice White thought the most compelling reason
for barring such evidence 12-simply vanishes.
The Court in Illinois Brick explicitly recognized that some
distribution chains are long. 26 It is also true that some chains are
complex-so complex, indeed, as to frustrate efforts to identify final
and, at times, intermediate purchasers. The Court, however, with-
out considering chain complexity, erroneously inferred from chain
length alone that it is difficult to determine whether passing on has
125 See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 731-33 & 732 n.12 (1977).
126 Id. 740-41.
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occurred.1 27 Rigorously considered, these are two separate, if re-
lated, problems. One is whether the distribution chain, however
long, is sufficiently simple and clear that an overcharge, if passed on,
can be traced; the other is whether an overcharge was passed on.
Because of chain complexity the first of these problems sometimes
presents insolvable difficulties, but the instances in which difficulties
are present are readily distinguishable from those in which they
are not. The evidence will quickly disclose how far the chain can
be followed before any overcharge, if passed on, becomes (if ever it
does) an indirect cost of a multiproduct firm. The second process-
determining how far an overcharge is passed down a chain, to the
extent the chain itself is discernible-is an entirely separate inquiry
and, contrary to the Court's unsupported factual conclusion, pre-
sents problems of manageable magnitude.
When final purchasers can be determined individually, it is
patently clear that a court can decide whether, and the extent to
which, an overcharge has been passed on to those purchasers. It
will be recalled from part V(A) that these cases tend to be con-
struction-contract cases or cases involving long and continuing busi-
ness relationships, all of which are likely to involve relatively large
claims by identifiable final purchasers. Even if it were essential to
measure precisely the amount of the overcharge absorbed by each in-
termediate and final purchaser, the techniques for empirical inquiry
are entirely adequate. Indeed, given the routine character of pric-
ing decisions, courts (and lawyers) will typically find tracing an
overcharge a more boring than perplexing task. It is, perhaps, a
worthy goal to protect courts from tedium, but surely not at the
cost of depriving parties injured by a blatant wrong from appro-
priate redress. With judicial capacity plainly existing, reluctance
to exercise that capacity is not an appealing foundation for national
policy.
There is, of course, a question whether the advantages achieved
by making the inquiry outweigh the costs, but in the cases we are
now considering-suits in which a firm must prove both violation
an injury-the potential value of redress is considered much as is
the value of any other claim in a treble-damage action. There is
127 Id. 741-44. Seemingly, the Court also thought that the only, or at least
primary, way to determine the amount of an overcharge is by measuring elasticities
of demand, a task it thought difcult. Id. 742. As we have shown, direct empirical
evidence may be used, and theoretical estimates depend not on measuring elasticities
of demand but on looking at a variety of readily determinable factors (including, in
some instances, whether elasticities of supply or demand have certain extreme, readily
identifiable characteristics).
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no reason to suppose these cases less worthy of judicial attention
than any others.
Moreover, it is easy to overestimate both the tedium and the
cost that would be involved in a passing-on investigation on behalf
of identified final purchasers. As shown in part V(B), reliable,
simplifying presumptions can be predicated upon a rather limited
inquiry into industry structure and practice; further, these pre-
sumptions would do substantial justice in most cases and could be
rebutted when wrong. Also, whether or not presumptions were
used, a court in its discretion could keep the passing-on inquiry
within reasonable bounds during the pretrial and trial. Even if
there are, say, ten distribution levels, the factual issue at each is
simple. If judicial involvement begins, and the adversary positions
regarding passing on are particularized, at an early stage, a reason-
able discovery program can be developed and administered which
will assure that passing-on issues, as well as others, are dealt with
efficiently.128 Judicial experience during the years between Hanover
Shoe' 29 and Illinois Brick fully confirms this conclusion. In
numerous cases, both trial and appeals courts, with the specific
factual content of a particular case before them, have expressed
confidence in the capacity of a trial court to trace the overcharge. 3
In some, the courts thought the evidence of a pass on to be un-
mistakably clear.131
Simplifying devices should, of course, be used.132  Often, claims
of several buyers at the same and different distribution levels will
'
2 8 See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAw
AND PRocEDuREs, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TBE ATTONEY GENE L § 1, at
17-23 (1979) [hereinafter cited as REVIEw oF ANirrUsT].
129392 U.S. 481 (1968).
130 E.g., West Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1086-88 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d
206, 210-11 (8th Cir. 1967); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 73 F.R.D. 322,
350-55 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 851, 862-65
(N.D. Cal. 1975); Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Petroleum Marketing Corp., 375
F. Supp. 1339, 1344-45 (D. Md. 1974); cf. In re Master Key Antitrust Litig.,
[1973-2] Trade Cas. 7174,680 (D. Conn. 1973), appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1975). There are also numerous other cases ruling that indirect purchasers
might pursue an overcharge cause of action, thus implicitly endorsing the view that
trial courts could handle the factual issues. These cases are collected in 1978
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 47-53.
131 West Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1971) (drugs sold by manufacturer to wholesalers, then marked up and
sold to retailers, then marked up and sold to consumers); Armco Steel Corp. v.
North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967) (steel plate sold to contractors and
marked up).
132 See, e.g., Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287, 292
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (enumerating procedural devices available to aid consolidation of
all suits arising from the same claim).
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be consolidated.133 When cases have been consolidated, courts can
try the issue of liability and the total amount of the overcharge first,
and leave passing-on and allocation questions to be tried only if
liability and the fact of an overcharge are established. When liti-
gated, allocation issues need not be particularly difficult. Allocation
among different distribution levels is susceptible to both theo-
retical and empirical investigation; allocation among purchasers at
any one level can be simplified by presuming that the sum allocable
to that level is itself allocable among particular buyers in a manner
proportional to their total purchases. Fair, sensible presumptions
of this character which save time and resources while preserving
substantial justice, are appropriate judicial responses to com-
plexity.1'
Note, too, that cases in which individual final purchasers are
identifiable are likely to be those in which either a class or parens
patriae action would be appropriate. Illinois Brick itself typifies
one pattern. The State of Illinois and over seven hundred of its
state and local agencies alleged that concrete-block manufacturers
had cartelized to impose an overcharge aggregating $3 million on
block sold to subcontractors doing work for contractors on public
buildings. In such a situation, the passing-on issues are not par-
ticularly difficult, and it is likely that the claims of all final pur-
chasers can be heard in a single suit. This may not always be
possible, however. In some instances a single, final purchaser with
a large individual claim might be motivated to sue alone or to opt
out of any pending class action, but, if several individual actions
were initiated, they could be consolidated for pretrial and eventually
tried together.135
Litigation problems are different when the class of final pur-
chasers is known but, because numbers are large and individual
133 Actions on behalf of consumers can be brought as parens patriae actions
under Title I of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements (Hart-Scott-Rodino)
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15C-15H (1976), or, in some circumstances, as class actions
under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See L. SuLr AN, supra
note 2, at § 249. Suits by individual or class claimants at the same or different
levels can be consolidated for pretrial or trial when in the same district, FED. B.
Cirv. P. 42, transferred on motion from one district to another to facilitate consolida-
tion, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1976), or transferred and consolidated for pretrial at the
initiative of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, id. § 1407.
I34 Although legislation is hardly necessary to facilitate such case management
by the courts in the interest of efficiency, the bill introduced by Representatives
Rodino, Sieberling, and Hughes on February 8, 1979, to overrule Illinois Brick
would specifically provide such power in a new section 41 of the Clayton Act.
H.R. 2060, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1979). See generally REVIEw or ANTTrausT,
supra note 128.
135 See note 133 supra & accompanying text.
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transactions small and nonrecurrent, it is difficult or costly to iden-
tify individual final purchasers. In these circumstances, individual
actions by single purchasers will not occur. Under present law, the
only means for bringing suits on behalf of these final purchasers are
consumer class actions, the utility of which has been greatly reduced
by restrictive judicial interpretation,'13 6 and parens patriae actions.
Moreover, even when an action is brought to a successful conclusion
on behalf of such purchasers, very few of them will claim the pro-
ceeds: some form of cy pres remedy is essential.
We do not challenge the soundness of Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin,3 7 which limits the situations in which consumer class
actions are feasible. Whatever one might conclude about the utility,
fairness, and feasibility of consumer class actions, there is no doubt
that Congress, aware of (and perhaps sharing) judicial reluctance to
countenance such actions, has made a deliberate choice to authorize
and encourage parens patriae actions to vindicate consumer interests
in these kinds of situations.138 Neither can there be doubt that
Illinois Brick frustrates that congressional choice. Given that over-
charges can be traced with ease in a large portion of cases (a fact
the Court has failed to perceive), and given the intent of Congress
in enacting the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, the argument is com-
pelling that parens patriae suits are the appropriate way to protect
the public when vast overcharges have been thinly spread among a
large class of consumers.
Such suits provide all or most of the advantages of consumer
class actions yet avoid all or most of the deficiencies which make
the latter problematical. Like consumer class actions, they are an
efficient means of aggregating large numbers of small overcharge
claims and could be utilized not merely to require wrongdoers to
disgorge, but also to develop cy pres remedies that substantially re-
imburse individuals actually injured. Unlike consumer class actions,
however, parens patriae actions are fueled not by the incentive of
large legal fees but by the incentive of state attorneys general to en-
hance the public welfare.138
136 See L. SurmxvAN, supra note 2, at § 249(a).
137417 U.S. 156 (1974).
138 The legislative history of Title IH of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act convinces
us that Congress was trying to create a more effective remedy for injured consumers.
See, e.g., K-R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-8 (1975) (Antitrust Parens
Patriae Act).
138a Landes and Posner, who stand aloof on the frictionless plane of price
theory when arguing about the incentives of direct purchasers to seek windfalls,
wander wide-eyed into the institutional underbrush in their eagerness to discredit the
potential of parens patriae suits to deter violations. See Landes & Posner, supra
note 61a, at 612-13. Whereas they portray corporate managers as rational profit-
maximizers, without a shred of evidence they freely fantasize that state attorneys
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Yet, even if one concluded that no action of any kind could
vindicate the interests of final purchasers when these purchasers can
be identified only by class, the argument for legislation to overrule
Illinois Brick would still be forceful. There would remain a large
number of cases in which passing on occurred, in which the victims,
the final purchasers, were readily identifiable as individuals, and in
which the overcharge passed on to these purchasers would be both
substantial in amount and easily traced. The conclusion that other,
quite different cases might present litigation problems lends no sup-
port to a rule which deprives affected purchasers in such relatively
easy cases of all possible redress for serious losses.
There is a related position-though it has more to do with
judicial custom than capacity-sometimes pressed to bolster the claim
that courts lack the ability to trace an overcharge: it is the rather
mystical assertion, originally attributable to that realist, Justice
Holmes, that courts terminate analyses after "the first step." 139 The
truth is that, throughout the history of judicial inquiry, courts have
both cut inquiry short and pressed it farther, depending upon which
course was most responsive to prevailing perceptions of policy. If
the common-law tradition has bearing, a useful distinction may be
perceived between tort and contract concepts. With limited ex-
ceptions, courts tend to limit liability for breach of contract to
parties that participated with the defendant in the transaction but
to extend liability for tort as far as causalities can be efficiently
traced. Cartelization, after all, is a blatant, deliberate tort with
potential for financial harm as great as or greater than many other
business torts. From the perspective of judicial tradition, the argu-
ment for tracing an overcharge through the distribution chain
from, for example, a manufacturer to ultimate consumers, is quite
as strong as that for holding the same manufacturer liable to the
same consumers for a product defect. Indeed, if the law were to
make distinctions between these cases, it might more logically treat
the cartelist-or monopolist-who knowingly imposes a tortious over-
charge more severely than it does the hapless manufacturer which
is well-intentioned but wanting in care.
B. Duplicative Liability and Compensatory Justice
The concept of "duplicative liability" requires definition. The
majority opinion in Illinois Brick seems to fear that if down-chain
general will bring "headline-grabbing, scapegoat-seeking lawsuits against politically
unpopular corporations." Id. 613.
139 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Damnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533
(1918).
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plaintiffs are permitted to recover, violators might be forced to
disgorge more than the statutory damages of three times the total
amount of the overcharge.140 Such a result might accurately be
called "excessive liability," and we shall use this designation when
we refer to it.
As a practical matter, to allow down-chain plaintiffs to sue
would create no risk of excessive liability. An overcharge is first
paid by a plurality of direct purchasers-that is, by all of the initial
customers of the monopolized or cartelized industry. Each of
these firms then sells to its own customers, multiplying the aggregate
size of the buyer group, and so on at each succeeding distribution
stage. An aggregate recovery equal even to the full amount of the
overcharge trebled could result only if suits were successsfully
brought on behalf of all direct purchasers or, if any one direct
purchaser did not recover, by all subsequent purchasers in the chain
beginning with any nonrecovering direct purchaser. Has any cartel
or monopolist ever been forced to account so comprehensively for
its overcharge? The question itself underscores the triviality of
the risk. Yet excessive liability implies a recovery even larger than
this-that is, larger than the maximum recovery that the statute
authorizes. Not only would the full overcharge imposed on all
direct purchasers have to be recovered and trebled, but also total
recoveries in at least one chain would have to exceed three times
the amount of the overcharge to the direct purchaser in that chain.
An unbiased observer would hardly place this risk very high on any
agenda of national policy concerns.
The risk of duplicative liability, then, if it is to be taken seri-
ously at all, must be taken to imply a more limited risk-that in one
or more chains beginning with a direct purchaser, there may be
successful suits by purchasers at two or more vertical levels which
are duplicative in that they are predicated, at least in part, upon
inconsistent findings about the extent of passing on. We shall use
the designation "duplicative liability," therefore, to refer to this
occurrence.
Picture, for example, a cartelist, M, that imposes an overcharge
of ten dollars on each of one hundred resellers, R, each of which re-
sell to ten consumers, C. Now assume that one of the resellers sues
and recovers three times ten dollars (on the theory that it paid the
full overcharge) and that a down-chain consumer also sues and re-
covers three times one dollar (on the theory that the overcharge was
fully passed on, one tenth to each of the ten consumers). This state
140 431 U.S. at 730-31.
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-of facts would involve no excessive liability as we have defined that
term. Excessive liability would occur if all resellers sued and re-
covered three times ten and, in addition, one or more down-chain
consumers sued and recovered three times one. On the other hand,
a recovery of three times ten by even one primary purchaser fol-
lowed by a recovery of three times one by a consumer lower in that
primary purchaser's chain would involve duplicative liability, as
we have defined it, inasmuch as the first recovery presupposes no
passing on and the second presupposes 100% passing on.
One might argue that duplicative, as distinguished from exces-
sive, liability ought not concern us, that lack of symmetry is more
an aesthetic than a policy deficiency. We reject that position, how-
ever. A satisfactory system of justice would avoid the windfall
resulting from overlapping liabilities, even though the violator has
not yet disgorged an amount approaching the total overcharge. We
do not, however, find in this demand of compensatory justice any
warrant for selecting primary purchasers as the presumptive victims
of all overcharges-the ones to whom the cause of action should
alone be assigned. (Indeed, because a high rate of passing on is
the rule, not the exception, any group to be chosen presumptively
ought to consist of the last identifiable purchasers in the chain,
not the first.)
Our conclusion, rather, is that duplicative liability, though a
concern, can be effectively avoided through adjudication. Because
tracing an overcharge is far simpler than the Court has supposed,
the risk of inconsistent findings is correspondingly smaller. The
Court has spoken as though the risk of inconsistent decisions about
passing on is peculiarly high because of factual complexity. In
many instances, the opposite will be true: evidence will be very
clear, and sequential trials, even if independently conducted, would
likely lead to consistent results.
Some risk of inconsistency does, of course, remain, but it is no
greater than that inevitably incurred when common questions are
presented in any series of litigated cases. The risk can be handled
by the customary methods for reducing inconsistent findings.
Such means are numerous. The four-year limitation statute
will give protection in some cases. 141 If the first suit is at all
delayed, it may soon become too late for competing claimants to
sue. This protection will not always be available, however. Of
greater significance, then, are the numerous devices which can bring
potentially inconsistent passing-on claims into a single proceeding
14115 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1976).
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which will foreclose inconsistent results. Transfer and consolida-
tion for pretrial at the direction of the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation will often be available. 142  A consolidated trial
involving all or a representative group of plaintiffs may be appropri-
ate.143 Courts and parties may also make use of interpleader144
Moreover, in appropriate cases, a court might require an over-
charge award to be held in escrow pending the outcome of other
suits in progress or about to be started. 4 5 Lastly, res judicata and
collateral estoppel will in many circumstances bind a party with
respect to liability, the total size of the overcharge, or the amount of
the overcharge allocable at different levels.
46
During the period between Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick,
courts successfully used some of these devices.147  As far as we are
aware, there is not a single credible claim that any defendant was
ever held to duplicative liability. The risk, then, is not merely one
that can be adequately handled case by case, it is one that judicial
experience shows to be easily managed.
There is, furthermore, an equally important concern about com-
pensatory justice which Illinois Brick ignores. Granting the over-
charge cause of action solely to direct purchasers would achieve a
14228 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976).
143Id. § 1407(h). Section 4 of S. 300, the pending bill to overrule Illinois
Brick, would amend this section to permit the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Liti-
gation to consolidate any related civil actions arising under the Clayton Act, including
suits by direct and indirect purchasers, for trial as well as pretrial. See 1979
SENATE REPoRT, supra note 18, pt. 2.
14428 U.S.C. §1335 (1976); FED. R. Crv. P. 22(1). As the Court noted in
Illinois Brick, although a defendant for its own reasons may neglect to interplead
competing claimants, they may be joined (individually or as a class) as necessary,
though not indispensable, parties. 431 U.S. at 738-40. See Comment, Standing to
Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing On, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 976,
997-98 (1975).
145 There seems little doubt that a court, under its general authority to
administer federal statutes in a manner doing substantial justice, could on motion
after verdict order an appropriate remittitur, even in a jury case, if duplicative
recovery rendered a verdict excessive. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476-85
(1934), and cases cited therein. Although a decision to delay judgment or execution
of verdict pending the outcome of a case not yet concluded is more extreme in
form, it would be predicated upon essentially the same theory. Doubt about judicial
power to use the escrow device could be resolved by appropriate provision in the
legislation to overrule Illinois Brick. A recent report states that a bill containing
such a provision is under consideration in the House Judiciary Committee. See
New House Proposals Emerge to Reverse Illinois Brick, [1979] 926 A Nmusr &
TAADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-7 to -8.
146 Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979) (allowing offensive
use of collateral estoppel under certain circumstances).
147 See cases cited in note 130 supra.
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just result if, but only if, direct purchasers were the ones actually
bearing the burden of the overcharge. To the extent that direct
purchasers pass the overcharge on to down-chain buyers, it is
-blatantly unfair to deny all redress to those down-chain purchasers.
Supporters of Illinois Brick recognize this dilemma and try to avoid
it by suggesting that much of the overcharge is ultimately borne by
the direct purchaser,148 but earlier parts of this Article show that this
response cannot withstand examination. Theoretical economics
and practical information about pricing practices suggest that even
in the short run massive passing on is the rule and that in the long
run it is well nigh inevitable.
When passing on is asserted affirmatively by a down-chain pur-
chaser, the claimant ought to bear the burden either of proving the
overcharge empirically or of proving the facts upon which a pre-
sumption of passing on can be based. When the plaintiff can
prove that it is a final purchaser, the further process of proving the
overcharge will be straightforward enough. In some instances, how-
ever, the distribution chain will become complex and obscure.
Especially when the overcharge is on a product the price of which
is classified as an indirect cost, the process of tracing may become
extremely difficult and, at some point in the chain, uncertain or
even speculative in outcome.
When difficulty reaches this stage, inquiry should stop: buyers
at or below these points in any chain should be denied the right to
try to show that passing on took place. Under the rubric of stand-
ing to sue, many courts prior to Illinois Brick handled the problem
presented by obscure chains in essentially this way; standing to
assert a claim based on passing on was allowed, as far down the
chain as the impact was discernible,149 and, at the point at which
tracing became speculative, standing was denied. 50
The ideal of compensatory justice, then, is simply not within
the reach of the judicial machinery in the instances in which pass-
ing on may or may not have occurred, but in which final purchasers
cannot be manageably identified either as individuals or as a class.
148 E.g., 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 15, pt. 2, at 315 (statement of
Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.).
149 E.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). For an interesting discussion of existing doc-
trine and its applicability in passing-on contexts, see Berger & Bernstein, supra
-note 5.
150 E.g., Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d
1187 (3d Cir. 1971).
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When the defendant can prove that the direct purchaser did pass
on, and when those ultimately injured cannot be identified, we
must choose among allowing the cartel or monopoly to retain the
overcharge, assigning the overcharge to the primary purchaser with-
out inquiry into whether or not passing on occurred, or assigning
it to the lowest identifiable purchaser on the chain, provided that
the purchaser can prove that the overcharge was passed to its level.
Our method of inquiry, described in part IV(A), implicitly
rejects choosing the first of these alternatives. We now make that
rejection explicit. To allow the violator to show passing on defen-
sively when there is no serious risk of duplicative liability would
be to grant a windfall to the violator-an aggravated violation of
the ideal of compensatory justice and a gratuitous sacrifice of the
deterrent effect of the treble-damage remedy. To allow primary
or subsequent-but still intermediate-purchasers to recover, even
though further passing on is suspected might or might not sacrifice
compensatory justice, but it would be a less serious imposition on
compensatory justice than allowing the wrongdoer to keep his gain,
and the deterrent effect of the treble-damage remedy would remain
intact.
Our choice between the direct purchaser and intermediate
down-chain purchasers to whom the overcharge can be traced is
to grant the remedy to the latter. The choice is between a firm that
both paid and passed on an overcharge, and a firm that paid and
may or may not have passed it on. The principle of compensatory
justice suggests at least a weak preference for the latter and, for
reasons explained in the next section, we think that choice will
in many circumstances have the greatest deterrent impact. Instead
of following the Holmesian dictum, which advocates stopping at the
first step, we think courts should be ready to trace the overcharge
as far as they reasonably can. For these reasons, legislation to over-
rule Illinois Brick should make clear that when a primary (or mid-
chain) purchaser sues for an overcharge, the defense that the plain-
tiff passed on should be available only in instances presenting a
real risk of duplicative liability. If plaintiff establishes that pos-
sible plaintiffs farther down the chain are barred by the statute of
limitations or have been served as necessary parties, yet have not
appeared and asserted a claim or otherwise can be shown not to
threaten duplicative liability, the reason for allowing the passing-on
defense is eliminated. In such circumstances the goal of deterrence
and the lack of any threat to compensatory justice should result in
rejection of a passing-on defense.
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C. Passing On and the Deterrence of Violations
The majority in Illinois Brick concluded that assigning the
cause of action for an overcharge solely to the direct purchaser
would provide greater deterrence than would granting relief to pur-
chasers (even when down-chain) that actually suffered the loss.151
The majority thus resolved what might be termed an issue of legis-
lative fact-an issue upon which it had little, if any, reliable em-
pirical information.
15 2
Direct purchasers have often sued in the past and sometimes
recovered large damages. 153 One must infer, moreover, that these
purchasers are encouraged to sue by Illinois Brick and would, to an
indeterminate extent, be discouraged from suing by a rule which
requires them not only to prove the offense and the overcharge but
also to defend against efforts by defendant or other claimants to
show that not all of the overcharge stayed in their hands. Neither
of these observations, however, warrants the conclusion that Illinois
Brick aids deterrence.
Information about the number of direct purchasers that have
sued in the past tells us nothing about their importance or sig-
nificance as private attorneys general unless we also know (or make
assumptions about) the total number of overcharges to b found in
the economy and, thus, about the percentage of all violators that
are sued by direct purchasers. Like the Court, we are without data
on this matter, and without data, claims either way about the
effectiveness of primary purchasers as antitrust enforcers pass wide
15 1 Thus, the majority read Hanover Shoe as "resting on the judgment that the
antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery for
the overcharge in the direct purchasers" and, in part for this reason, declined to
permit down-chain purchasers to prove passing-on. 431 U.S. at 735.
152 It is unfortunate that there is so little accessible data regarding the relation-
ship between government and private antitrust actions. Such information would be
valuable not only for the present needs-evaluating the deterrent effects of alterna-
tive policies-but would be of enormous value in the allocation of resources within
antitrust enforcement agencies. In a proposal for a research project which would
collect and analyze such data, M. Block, H. Demmert, & F. Nold supra note 56, at
35, present preliminary evidence showing that private actions are surprisingly infre-
quent when the government has already won a case against conspirators. Of the 49
price-fixing cases won (by verdict or nolo contendere plea) by the government in
the period 1971 to 1976, private actions against the conspirators have been brought
in only 18 cases. In its most immediate bearing on the deterrent effects of Illinois
Brick, this evidence suggests that even when presented with the facts of a successful
government action, which can be introduced in trial by private plaintiff, direct pur-
chasers-who would almost certainly learn of the violation through their trade publi-
cations-often lack incentive to sue.
153 Cases are collected in Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An
Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-977, 77 COLumV. L. REv. 979, 1000-01
(1977).
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of the mark.5 4  Moreover, were it assumed that an inference can
be drawn from the existence of past direct-purchaser suits, the
plausible inference would be that these purchasers are little de-
terred by the risk of competing claimants farther down the chain.
In suits started before Illinois Brick, direct purchasers faced that
risk but sued anyway.
By contrast, the contention that legislative overruling of Illinois
Brick would inevitably deter direct-purchaser suits to some extent
is supported by the conventional marginal analysis of theoretical
economics. 155  It is the net effect of Illinois Brick that is important,
however, and there is reason to believe that legislative reversal would
have a relatively small deterrent effect on suits by direct purchasers
and a much larger and more significant effect in encouraging suits
on behalf of down-chain purchasers.
The deterrent effect of overruling Illinois Brick on suits by
direct purchasers would not be a smooth, continuous function, so
that each marginal addition to the difficulty of the litigation would
deter some marginal number of potential direct-purchaser plaintiffs.
Common sense and experience both suggest that a party that is
likely to litigate in the hope of recovering, say, a million-dollar
overcharge, is likely to do so within a fairly wide range of predic-
tions or expectations about the risk and difficulties of the lawsuit.
One concern of any potential plaintiff will be the anticipated
cost of the suit. At the beginning of any complex case, this is ex-
154Landes and Posner claim to present evidence supporting their argument that
direct purchasers are the most vigorous enforcers. The only data they offer, Landes
& Posner, supra note 61a, at 629 (Table 1), show that the ratio of private antitrust
actions to private civil actions and the ratio of private antitrust actions to government
antitrust actions have both increased during the period 1960-1978. Statistical
machinations notwithstanding, Landes and Posner fail to substantiate their claim
because their data do not discriminate between actions brought by direct purchasers
and those brought by indirect purchasers, or even between overcharge actions and
actions by competitors, franchisees, or others making antitrust claims wholly unrelated
to the passing-on problem.
Impression-supporting information, such as that collected by Professor
Handler, supra note 153, cuts both ways. Indirect purchasers were plaintiffs in
almost two-thirds of all private treble-damage actions brought since 1960, and were
the only plaintiffs in about 25% of all cases. Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1979:
Hearings on S.300 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
12 (1979); 1979 SENATE REPORT, supra note 19, at 16. Moreover, there are some
significant overcharge cases in which primary purchasers were discernibly less aggres-
sive enforcers than downstream buyers. E.g., West Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440
F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971). Given that the recent
parens patriae legislation opens up significant new potential for enforcement by
states on behalf of consumers, there seems little doubt that the vigor and frequency
of enforcement by (and on behalf of) downstream buyers will increase.
155 But see 1978 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 192-95 (statement of
Richard A. Posner).
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tremely difficult to estimate beyond saying that the costs will be
high. It is unlikely that the presence or absence of a passing-on
defense will be a key factor in a decision to sue. The gestalt con-
cern is whether the estimated potential recovery is large enough to
pursue through complex litigation. Anyone who considers himself
a potential plaintiff at all is likely to remain one within a fairly wide
variation of estimates about the likely size of the recovery. A
direct purchaser that has suffered substantial losses is not likely
to give up at the outset upon learning that recovery will be limited
to three times those injuries and will not include injuries suffered
by others. Whether the probability of success makes the effort and
expense worthwhile involves numerous complex questions concern-
ing liability and damage calculation. It does not seem likely that
the addition of a passing-on issue will often prove critical in the
calculations of a potential plaintiff with real and substantial losses.
Conceivably, some potential plaintiffs will give up solely be-
cause of the passing-on defense, but these may not be particularly
important ones. They are likely to be those that know that they
have in fact passed on all of the overcharge and that, if they sued,
would be doing so as bounty hunters seeking a windfall. Whole-
salers or retailers in some of the antibiotic cases are, perhaps, per-
tinent examples.156 Few such purchasers sued before Illinois Brick
and experience suggests that those who do sue are likely to be "tag
along" plaintiffs seeking a windfall settlement. It is possible that
the Illinois Brick result will encourage more such direct purchasers
to sue, but that expectation does not necessarily make Illinois Brick
more attractive. Potential plaintiffs without real injury are seldom
likely to be the only (or even the most likely) plaintiffs unless the
operative rule of law precludes suit by parties actually injured.
Remember that the deterrent effect of Illinois Brick on suits
by down-chain purchasers is absolute: given Illinois Brick, none of
them will sue. Legislation which overrules that case would there-
fore likely encourage more overcharge enforcement cases than it
would discourage. There are situations in which granting the
cause of action solely to direct purchasers effectively forecloses any
private suit. Often, direct purchasers pass on all or substantially all
of the overcharge. This will be especially so in the cases which
are socially more harmful-those in which the monopoly or cartel
is well entrenched and direct and other purchasers have made long-
term adjustments. If the ongoing relationship between the direct
156 See, e.g., West Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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purchaser and the potential defendant has any value to the direct
purchaser (and often it will have), the direct purchaser will to that
extent be deterred from suing. (Indeed, even in cases in which
the direct purchaser absorbs a significant part of the overcharge, it
may often be deterred by the risk of being cut off entirely.) It is
true that some direct purchasers that suffered little or no real loss
-for example, wholesalers in the antibiotic cases 157-have brought
suit in the past, but this does not diminish the force of our concern.
The instances in which direct purchasers do sue tend to be those in
which the cartelized product is peripheral rather than central to
the direct purchasers' business needs, and in which the direct pur-
chaser deals with several sellers at the cartelized level. Then, the
direct purchaser is likely to have convenient alternative ways to
continue to meet its need for supplies: it can withstand disruption
of its relationship with the violator.1 58 Many direct purchasers,
however, are in long-term, ongoing supply relationships with a
single firm (or a few) and are extremely dependent upon supplier
continuity and goodwill. An automobile or television dealer serves
as an example. Such a direct purchaser is highly unlikely to sue
its supplier unless the relationship has been independently dis-
rupted15af In numerous instances, then, if down-chain purchasers
have no cause of action, no suit is likely to be brought.
Direct purchasers do have one advantage as potential en-
forcers: they are closer to the violation and thus may be in a better
position to be aware of it.159 Yet, there are limits to the significance
157 Id.
158Even in these situations direct purchasers may well be deterred. For
example, if A, a distributor or wholesaler, brings an antitrust complaint in an effort
to stop an antitrust violation by B, a manufacturer of one product in which A deals,
A may find that C, D, and E, suppliers of other products in which A deals, begin
to look for alternative distribution outlets.
i5sa Landes and Posner claim that "the idea that purchasers are bashful about
suing their suppliers is today unrealistic, almost quaint," Landes & Posner, supra
note 61a, at 614, but citing evidence that direct purchasers bring suits does not
substantiate that claim. Because the total number of violations is unknown, there
may be many cases in which direct purchasers do not bring actions against violators.
Managers do not typically regard disruptions in su],ply as costless-they recognize
that long-term supply relationships and business reputation have significant economic
value not to be frittered away on antitrust actions unless the potential damage award
is substantial. Moreover, the Landes-Posner analysis assumes that potential plaintiffs
will treat every dollar of profit identically, whether earned by selling their products,
recovering demonstrable losses (that is, monopoly overcharges not passed on), or
windfall gains (that is, recovery of monopoly overcharges which had been passed
on). We refuse to accept this characterization of managerial mentality in American
society.
159 1978 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 193 (statement of Richard A.
Posner).
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of propinquity. If the overcharge item represents a relatively small
part of the direct purchaser's total cost, that purchaser's sensitivity
may well be quite low and if it represents a very large part of cost,
a dependency relationship is likely to dampen enthusiasm for a
suit. Moreover, if the cartel or monopoly has been operating very
long, direct purchasers will have made long-run adjustments (in-
volving reduced capital investment) and will be earning normal
returns (on the smaller capital that remains). Also, if Illinois Brick
is overruled, a direct purchaser suffering from a violation but
deterred from bringing suit, has alternative recourse: it can notify
the Department of Justice or a state attorney general, or it can
gossip to down-chain purchasers which, not being under dependency
constraints, may sue. Illinois Brick forecloses the latter response.
160
In any event, judicial experience during the years before
Illinois Brick suggests that down-chain purchasers do identify viola-
dons and that, before being stifled by that case, were becoming in-
creasingly vigilant as private attorneys general.161  In many im-
portant cases, these buyers played a significant role.162 Furthermore,
cutting off down-chain purchasers frustrates a significant movement
in antitrust enforcement which has been growing for some time and
which Congress, in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,168 sought to foster
and encourage-suits on behalf of the states and their subdivisions as
down-the-line purchasers and, in parens patriae actions, on behalf
of state residents as ultimate consumers. The increasing skill and
sophistication of state attorneys general in antitrust is one of the
1,0 If the fact that information may be accessible to direct purchasers makes
necessary a bounty to direct purchasers, there are more selective ways to grant one
than by offering three times the overcharge, as does the Illinois Brick rule. Congress
could legislate to provide an appropriate bounty for the provision to the Deparnment
of Justice of information leading to successful criminal or civil proceedings against
the violator. This approach would encourage any party with information to report
it and would not deprive any injured party of incentive to sue. Cf. I.R.C. § 7623;
Treas. Reg. § 301.7623 (1959) (providing for payments to those who inform about
Internal Revenue Code violations).
161 See note 154 supra.
162 Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Western
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919
(1974); Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376 F.2d 206, 210-11 (8th Cir. 1967);
South Carolina Council of Milk Producers, Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 76 F.R.D. 570
(E.D. La. 1976); In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., [1973-2] Trade Cas. I 74,680
(D. Conn. 1973), appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975). We are expressing
here an impressionistic view. The incomplete data are no more logically compelling
on our side of the argument than they are on Professor Handler's. See notes
153 & 154 supra.
163 15 U.S.C. §§ 15C-15H (1976).
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most hopeful signs for the free-enterprise system."" Illinois Brick
does more than reduce state enforcement of the federal law: it also
discourages states from refining and vigorously enforcing their own
antitrust laws and thus destroys the hope that, as they become more
aware of the advantages of free-market competition, they will con-
sider the potential advantages of deregulation at the state level.
To summarize, if the law is serious about deterring monopoly
pricing, then it is surely counterproductive to designate as the only
possible private attorney general the purchaser likely to have the
least incentive to sue and the greatest incentive to accept the status
quo. Yet, Illinois Brick does precisely that.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis uncovers the misapprehensions that underlie the
Illinois Brick decision and brings into focus several of the defi-
ciencies in the policy established by that decision. There is simply
no credible argument that courts cannot handle passing-on issues.
Clearly, they can. When they fail to do so, they sacrifice the de-
sideratum of compensatory justice. Nor is there any credible basis
for concluding that antitrust enforcement is invigorated by the
rule of Illinois Brick: more likely its effect is quite the opposite.
Congress, therefore, should pass legislation overruling Illinois Brick
in the interest of deterring cartelization and monopolization and
compensating the actual victims of these offenses.
-64 See, e.g., 1978 House Hearings, supra note 15, at 36-43 (statement of Bruce
E. Babbitt).
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